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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the Auxiliary Power Unit
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1.0 EXECUTIVE_SUMMARY .....
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given 5y the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986. The IOA
a-_roach features a_-6p-o_n analy-{is of the--h-_dware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter
Auxiliary Power Unit (APU).
The APUs are required to provide power to the Orbiter hydraulics
systems during ascent and entry flight phases for aerosurface
actuation, main engine gimballing, landing gear extension, and
other vital functions. For analysis purposes, the APU system was
broken down into ten functional subsystems.
The IOA analysis process utilized available APU hardware drawings
and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and
hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and
analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was
assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure
mode.
Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the ten analysis breakdown subsystems of the APU. A summary
of the number of failure modes, by criticality, is also presented
below with Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F)
criticality second.
Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
Criticality: I i/1 I 2/IRNumber : 37 84
2/2 3/1R
93 3/2R[I 3/386
TOTAL
301
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Figure 1 - APU OVERVIEW ANALYSIS SUMMARY
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mFor each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
Summary of IOA Potential Critical i£ems (HWIF)
Criticality: [ i/iNumber : 37
2/IR
84
2/2
3/IR[27 3/2R[I TOTAL149
The preponderince of i/1 it_mS_=:are failures that allow the APU
hydrazine fuel to escape into the Orbiter aft compartment,
creating a severe fire hazard, and failures that cause loss of
the gas generator injector cooling system.
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2. i Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phaSes_ '_......
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to break down the respective
subsystem into components and low-level hardware items. Each
hardware item is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and
criticality. These data are documented in the respective
subsystem analysis report, and are used to assess the NASA and
Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL reevaluation results. The IOA analysis
approach is summarized in the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0.
Step 4.0 summarizes the assessment of the NASA and Prime
Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is performed and documented at a later
date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
i.I Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
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Step 4.0 Compare I0A analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 APU Ground Rules and Assumptions
The APU ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined
in Appendix B.
Due to resource and schedule constraints and lack of adequate
data, the Controller analysis was done to a functional level
only; the criticalities of failures in key controller functions
were assessed. This matches the analysis level of the NASA
FMEA/CIL.
The APU gas generator injector cooling system and fuel pump/GGVM
cooling system failure criticalities were assigned based on a
sudden deorbit with hot APUs, which is the flight situation in
which these systems are of critical importance. It was assumed
that a worst case AT0 would produce the same situation, as well.
This produced several i/i criticalities due to the lack of
redundancy in the gas generator injector cooling system.
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SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Design and Function
The Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) subsystem converts chemical
energy stored in liquid hydrazine to mechanical shaft
power. The Orbiter has three completely independent APUs,
with each APU driving one hydraulic pump.
Each APU subsystem consists of the following:
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
A fuel supply and distribution system
An auxiliary power unit and controller
An exhaust duct assembly
A fuel thermal control system
A fuel pump seal cavity drain line ii
A fuel pump/valve module cooling system
A gas generator injector cooling system
The hydrazine is delivered to the APU gas generator via the
fuel pump. The catalyst in the gas generator causes the
hydrazine to decompose. The hot gases make two passes
through the turbine, which in turn provides mechanical power
to the APU gearbox. Through gear reduction, power is
provided to drive the APU fuel pump, lube oil pump, and
hydraulic oil pump.
Three water tanks and associated lines are provided to cool
the fuel pumps and gas generator valve modules after APU
shutdown on-orbit and to cool the gas generator injectors
should an emergency hot start be required.
The hydrazine fuel supply is stored in the fuel tank and is
pressurized with nitrogen during servicing. The pressure
provides start capability until the fuel pump is running and
acts against the tank diaphragm to positively expel fuel to
the APU. The fuel pump provides a constant flow of
hydrazine to the valve module after the initial bootstrap
start.
Two parallel fuel isolation valves are manually actuated by
the crew during APU activation and deactivation. During
nonoperating periods, they isolate the fuel supply to
prevent further fuel flow. Each valve has a reverse-flow
pressure-relief feature to prevent system damage due to
expansion of fuel trapped between the valves and the APU.
The APu turbine speed is controlled by the Gas Generator
Valve Module (GGVM). The valve module consists of two
flapper-type valves in series. The primary or modulating
valve downstream of the pump is normally open and allows
flow to the secondary or shutoff valve. The secondary valve
is normally in by-pass, which directs hydrazine flow back to
the pump inlet. In the powered state, it allows hydrazlne
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flow to the gas generator. The APU controller cycles these
valves to maintain proper turbine speed. The gas generator
is a container for a granular catalyst. When hydrazine
comes in contact with the catalyst, decomposition occurs,
and the hot gases produced are directed to the turbine.
The dual-pass turbine assembly converts hot gas kinetic
energy into mechanical shaft power at the desired speeds to
operate the hydraulic pump, lube oil pump, and fuel pump.
The speed-reduclng gearbox contains gears, bearings, seals,
and a scavenger lubrication system. The gearbox is
pressurized with nitrogen to prevent vaporization of the
lubricant. A lube oil pump circulates the lube oil to the
hydraulic water boiler for cooling. The gearbox has a
pressurization system consisting of a small GN2 bottle and
solenoid shutoff valve actuated by the controller.
The APU controller provides speed control, logic for APU
startup and shutdown, signal conditioning, heater control,
gearbox pressure control, and malfunction detection
capability.
The exhaust duct assembly directs the APU exhaust products
overboard through an exit at the upper aft fuselage skin.
Exhaust duct assemblies 1 and 2 are located on the port side
and duct 3 is on the starboard side of the aft fuselage at
the base of the vertical stabilizer.
The fuel tank, fuel line, fuel pump, and lube oil line
heaters are sized to maintain the fuel and lube oil above
minimum temperature during any Orbiter mission. The gas
generator heaters provide a means of preheating the catalyst
to > 190 degrees F for controlled decomposition.
Insulation for the APU prevents excessive temperatures in
the fuel system as a result of entry heating.
The fuel pump and gas generator valve modules are maintained
below 200 degrees F after APU shutdown by a water spray
system consisting of two water tanks and associated lines,
switches, thermostats, and timers. This system is only
required on-orbit when convective cooling is insufficient to
cool these components.
A single water tank with lines to all three APUs is provided
to cool the gas generator injector should an APU restart be
required before the gas generator can cool naturally.
Control is via the APU controller.
7
I3.2 Interfaces and Locations
Figure 2 depicts the APU interfaces' The APU and APU
Controller receive electric power from various Orbiter Aft
Load c0ntrollers, Aft Power Controlle#s_Contr01 Buses, and
Essential Buses. APU gauges ire powered by Panel Bus Main B
015.
All three APUs are mounted on the 1307 bulkhead, =in the
Orbiter aft compartment. APU's 1 and 2 are located in close
proximity toward the port side of the bulkhead. APU 3 is
Slightly further away, £oward the starboard side.
The APU fuel tanks are mounted on the sides of the aft
compartment, about 7 feet aft of the 1307 bulkhead. Tanks
1 and 2 are on the port side, in close proximity Tank 3 is
on the starboard side. Figure 3 shows the locations of the
three APUs and associated fuel tanks, fuel lines, and the
lube oil lines.
APU lube oil cooling is provided by the Orbiter Water Spray
Boilers, one for each APU.
The Controllers for APU l, 2 and 3 are mounted on freon
coldplates in Aft Avionics Bays 4, 5 and 6, respectively.
The APUs are controiled during flight by flight crew
switches only - no uplink commands are possible. Many APU
functions can be controlled from the ground prelaunch by way
of the Launch Aft MDM, however.
3.3 Functional Breakdown
For analysis purposes, the APU was broken down into the
following functional subsystems:
i. Power System
2. Fuel System
3. Lube Oil System
4. Gas Generator Injector Cooling System
Fuel Pump/GGVM C0oling System
Structure
Electrical System
Displays
Instrumentation
Controller
c
.
6.
7.
8.
9.
i0.
These subsystems are described below.
l , The Power System consists of the components involved in
generating shaft power from the exothermic reaction -
the gas generator, turbine wheel, exhaust duct,
gearbox, gas generator bed heaters, and the turbine
speed sensors.
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Figure 2 - APU INTERFACES
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Figure 3 - APU LOCATION
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I0.
The Fuel System consists of all components involved in
storing fuel, and supplying it to the gas generator -
the fuel tank, fuel lines, valves, fuel pump, and
heaters.
The Lube Oil System includes the lube oil lines, pump,
couplings, accumulators, and heaters.
The Gas Generator Injector Cooling System includes all
valves, water tanks, water lines, couplings, and
heaters associated with this cooling system•
The Fuel Pump/GGVM Cooling System includes all valves,
water tanks, water lines, nitrogen lines, couplings,
and heaters associated with this cooling system.
The Structures analyzed include the APU turbine and
gearbox housings.
The Electrical System includes circuitry specifically
associated with the APU, including the APU switches.
Displays include all APU gauges and talkbacks.
Instrumentation includes all APU transducers except
for the turbine speed sensors, which are covered under
the power System.
The APU Controller was analyzed to the functional level
only. The analysis examines the consequences of loss
of the Controller's important functions•
Figure 4 presents a highly simplified breakdown of the APU
components, reflecting the functional subsystems described
above (except for the structures, electrical, displays, and
instrumentation subsystems).
Figure 5 presents the top-level hierarchy used in the APU
analysis.
Figures 6 through 15 present the breakdown hierarchy of the
ten APU subsystems described on Page 9.
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Figure 4 - APU FUNCTIONAL BREAKDOWN
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Figure 5 - APU TOP LEVEL HIERARCHY
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Figure 6 - POWER SYSTEM HIERARCHY
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Figure 7 - FUEL SYSTEM HIERARCHY
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Figure 8 - LUBE 0IL SYSTEM HIERARCHY
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Figure 9 - GAS GENERATOR INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM HIERARCHY
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Figure l0 - FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM HIERARCHY
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Figure Ii - STRUCTURES
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Figure 12 - ELECTRICAL SYSTEM HIERARCHY
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Figure 14 - INSTRUMENTATION HIERARCHY
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4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of
the failure criticalities. Further discussion of each of these
subdivisions and the applicable failure modes is provided in
subsequent paragraphs.
m
m
m
m
TABLE I Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
Criticality:
Power System
Fuel System
Lube Oil
System
GG Injector
Cooling
Fuel Pump/
GGVM Cooling
Structures
Electrical
System
Displays
Instrumen-
tation
Controller
TOTAL
1/l
4
2O
1
7
1
3
m
1
37
2/IR
4
22
16
5
13
3
14
7
84
2/2 3/IR
5
20
ii
4
12
30
4
7
93
3/2R
1
m
w
3/3
2
9
9
6
5
37
i0
1
7
86
TOTAL
15
72
37
22
30
4
84
i0
5
22
301
m
m
m
m
m
m
i
m
m
Of the 301 failure modes analyzed, 37 were determined to result
in loss of crew or vehicle, and 84 created a situation where one
additional failure would result in loss of crew or vehicle. A
summary of the potential critical _tems is presented in Table II.
Appendix D presents a cross reference between each Potential
Critical Item (PCI) and a specific worksheet in Appendix C.
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Criticality:
TABLE II Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
Power System
Fuel System
Lube Oil
System
GG Injector
Cooling
Fuel Pump/
GGVM Cooling
Structures
Electrical
System
Displays
Instrumen-
tation
Controller
i/i
4
20
1
37
2/IR 2/2
4
22
16
5
13
3
14
7
84
3/1R
3
3
17
2
2
27
3/2R
1
w
TOTAL
TOTAL
8
46
20
12
13
4
34
2
i0
149
4.1 Analysis Results - Power System
The power system analysis identified 15 failure modes, of which
4 were determined to be of criticality i/i, and 4 to be of
criticality 2/IR. Eight PCIs were identified.
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4.2 Analysis Results - Fuel System
The fuel system analysis id ntified 72 failure modes, of which
20 were determined to be of criticality i/i. This high number of
i/i failure modes is due mainly to the fact that all APU fuel
leaks into the Orbiter aft compartment are considered to be
criticality i/i. Forty-six PCIs were identified.
4.3 Analysis Results - Lube Oil System
The lube oil system analysis identified 37 failure modes, of
which the largest number were determined to be criticality 2/IR
or 3/1R. Only one failure mode was determined to be criticality
i/i. Twenty PCIs were identified.
m
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4.4 Analysis Results - Gas Generator In3ector Cooling System
The gas generator injector cooling system analysis identified 22
failure modes, seven of which were determined to be of
criticality i/i. The high number of i/i failure modes stems from
the lack of redundancy in this cooling system. Twelve PCIs were
identified.
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4.5 Analysis Results - Fuel Pump/GGVM Cooling System
The fuel pump/GGVM cooling system analysis identified 30 failure
modes, none of which were identified to be of criticality i/i.
Thirteen were determined to be of criticality 2/IR. Thirteen
PCIs were identified.
4.6 Analysis Results - Structure
The APU structure analysis identified four failure modes for the
APU turbine and gearbox housings. Of these 4, 1 was determined
to be criticality i/i, and the rest 2/IR. Four PCIs were
identified.
m
I
B
B
mm
i
m
4.7 Analysis Results - Electrical System
The electrical system analysis identified 84 failure modes. The
greatest number were determined to be criticality 3/3 or 3/IR,
but three I/i failures were identified, and several 2/IR failures
were also identified. Thirty-four PCIs were identified.
4.8 Analysis Results - Displays
Ten failure modes were identified for the APU displays. All were
determined to be criticality 3/3. No PCis were identified.
4.9 Analysis Results - Instrumentation
In the instrumentation system, four failure modes were determined
to be criticality 3/IR. All other failure modes were determined
to be 3/3, and were lumped together into one failure report. Two
PCIs were identified.
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4.10 Analysis Results - Controller
The APU controller functions were analyzed, and 22 failure modes
were identified. One of these was determined to be criticality
I/I, and several were determined to be 2/IR and 3/IR. The 1/l
criticality failure mode is one that eliminates the hot restart
capability for all three APUs. Ten PCIs were identified.
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
u
[]
AOA
APU
ATO
CIL
CRT
EGT
F
FM
FMEA
GFE
GG
GGVM
GN2
HW
IOA
LCA
MDAC
MDM
N2
NASA
NH3
NSTS
PCI
psia
RTLS
STS
TAL
WSB
- Abort Once Around
- Auxiliary Power Unit
- Abort to Orbit
- Critical Items List
- Cathode Ray Tube
- Exhaust Gas Temperature
- Fahrenheit, Functional
-- Failure Mode
m
w
Q
i
l
w
w
m
m
m
w
u
m
w
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
Government Furnished Equipment
Gas Generator
Gas Ge/erator Valve Module
Gaseous Nitrogen
Hardware
Independent Orbi%er Assessment ......
Load Control Assembly
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
Nitrogen
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Ammonia
National Space Transportation System
Potential Critical Item
Pounds Per Square Inch, Absolute
Return to Launch Site
Space Transportation System
Transatlantic Abort Landing
Water Spray Boiler
mm
mR
l
m
mm
[]
I
m
I
mm
I
I
z
=.
i
[]
m
m
mm
A-I
m
uAPPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
m
B.1
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
m
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were Used with the t_6_lowing
a'mpiifications--and additT6-_.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
_--6PS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-fiigh_
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsiti0n to OPS 9, post'flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
p--_ed end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(opsf
M__C - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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mMULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OP___SS- software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up an--_ds at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transitio-n out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at r_ition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and en--_at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ens--_ith the completion of post-landing
safing operations
w
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
D
m
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
ii L ....
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, i00--_ober 1986, was employe--d--with the
following amp-lificati6ns a-nd addition?
g
z
g
,
,
•
•
•
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
m+anagement (SM) or-w_ic_n--drives-any part of the Caution and
warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item•
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
func£ional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown•
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawlngs.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their perf_ance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed Joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
B-5
B.3 APU-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly level
of the APU subsystem. The analysis considered the worst case
effects of the hardware or functional failure on the subsystem,
mission, and crew and vehicle safety.
i , The APU Controller was analyzed only to the functional
level.
RATIONALE: This is in keeping with the NASA and
Rockwell analyses, and is due to lack of
adequate data, and resource and schedule
constraints.
2. Couplings with caps were considered as one unit for
analysis purposes.
RATIONALE: This simplified the analysis, and took into
account the worst case failure (external
leak).
3. Switches were analyzed as failing totally open or
totally closed, regard!ess of the number of switch
contacts. For multiposition switches, the analysis
considered the Worst-dase position for failed-on cases.
.
RATIONALE: This simplified the analysis, and took into
account the worst case failure (failure of
all contacts is worse than failure of any
one contact).
Fuel line temperature Sensor failUres were considered
criticality 3/3, except in cases where fewer than 3
sensors were available to monitor the status of a
particular fuel line heater.
.
RATIONALE: This was to avoid classifying all fuel line
temperaturesensor failures as 3/IR or
greater, 5ased_Sn loss of detection of a
failed-on heater.
The APU Fuel Pump/GGVM Cooling System and Gas Generator
Injector Cooling System failures were assigned
criticalities based on the effects of the failure
during a flight situation where these cooling systems
were required £o be used.
RATIONALE: This approach considered the worst case
effects of loss of a system - loss of that
system under circumstances where use of
the system is required.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of
these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed, and
parent assembly, as well as the function. For each failure mode,
the possible causes are outlined, and the assessed hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase is listed, as
described in the NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA
and CIL, i00ctobe-r [986. Finally, effects are entered at--Ehe
b-_t_ of_ach sheet, and the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
w
=
w
Hardware Criticalities:
1 _ Loss of life or vehicle
2 _ Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehlcle
3 - All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 - Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 _ Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA _ Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P - Passed Screen
F - Failed Screen
NA - Not Applicable
E_
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/22/86 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: I00 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GAS GENERATOR
NO OUTPUT OR LOW OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU _ _ _ _
2) POWER SYSTEM
3) GAS GENERATOR
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES ...........
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ]
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: I/1
TAL: 1/1
AOA: 1/1
ATO: 1/1
B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC20i-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BED LIFETIME EXCEEDED, CRACKED OR LEAKING
HOUSING ......
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF OUTPUT IS REDUCED SUFFICIENTY, APU WILL SUFFER UNDERSPEED
SHUTDOWN. CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE TO LOSS OF ONE APU. ABORT:
CRITICALITY IS i/I FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF
ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE.
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: I01 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GAS Gm rATOR
LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) POWER SYSTEM
3) GAS GENERATOR
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH: 1/1
LIFTOFF_ I/i
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: I/I
LANDING/SAYING: 1/1
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CORROSION, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUEL LEAK CAN CAUSE FIRE; DETONATION OF FUEL IN FUEL PUMP AND
FUEL VALVES. POSSIBLEDAMAGE TO OTHER APUIS FROM SHRAPNEL.
CRITICALITY IS I/I DUE TO FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD.
i
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-3
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/!
1/i
ITEM: TURBINE WHEEL
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) POWER SYSTEM
3) TURBINE WHEEL
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
_ITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: i/I ......RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: I/I TAL: I/!
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/i ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ] ....
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT .......
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001 .....
CAUSES: OVERSPEED, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE,: _:
CONTAMINATION DAMAGE_D_FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF APU, S__iq_ AFT COMPARTMENT-PO_I_ _SS OF
ANO__, OR FUEL LEAK. t_IT_CALITY IS i/i DUE TO SHRAPNEL
DAMAGE EFFECTS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/18/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/1
ITEM: TURBINE WHEEL
FAILURE MODE: BINDING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) POWER SYSTEM
3) TURBINE WHEEL
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: i/1
ONORB IT: 2/ 1R AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE, BEARING FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TURBINE MAY SEIZE UP; APU MAY EXPERIENCE UNDERSPEED SHUTDOWN.
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE TO LOSS OF APU.
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 1/1 FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE
LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-5
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITERSUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 104 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM: EXHAUST DUCT
FAILURE MODE: LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) POWER SYSTEM
3) EXHAUST DUCT
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/ieUNC ABOI_T HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/.i RTLS • 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: I/i .... __
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: _ COMPARTMENT _..............
PART _BER: MC271-0080-O94X .............
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE, FATIGUE FAILURE ,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RELEASES HOT (-1000F) GASES INTO AFT COMPARTMENT. THIS HOT GAS
COULD CAUSE DAMAGE TO OTHER AFT CORFP_"IrM_qT EOUIPMENT, INCLUDING
FIRE, AND LOSS OF MULTIPLE APU_S. CRITICALITY IS 1/1 DUE TO FIRE
HAZARD AND EFFECT ON OTHER EQUIPMENT.
REFERENCES :
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
105 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXHAUST DUCT BELLOWS
LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) POWER SYSTEM
3) EXHAUST DUCT
4) BELLOWS
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC271-0080-094X
CAUSES: FATIGUE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RELEASES HOT (-1000F) GASES INTO AFT COMPARTMENT. THIS HOT GAS
COULD CAUSE DAMAGE TO OTHER AFT COMPARTMENT EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING
FIRE AND LOSS OF MULTIPLE APU_S. CRITICALITY IS i/I DUE TO FIRE
HAZARD AND EFFECT ON OTHER EQUIPMENT.
REFERENCES: NO DESIGN DATA WAS OBTAINED FOR THIS ITEM.
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-7
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 106 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
i/I
ITEM: GEARBOX
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) APU
2) POWER SYSTEM
3) GEARBOX
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFr0FF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
CRITI_iTiES
HDW/FUNC .........._RT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 1/1
2/1R TAL: 1/1
2/!R AOA: I/i
2/1R ATO: 1/1
211R
B [P] c[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC2 oi- 0001
CAUSES: STRIPPED GEARS, BROKEN SHAFTS, SEIZED BEARINGS, CRACKED
AND DISTORTED HOUSING CAUSING RUBBING OR FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
APU WILL BE LOST DUE TO LOSS _F-FUEL P--UMP OR L_ _iL PUMP, OR
HYDRA_C SYSTEM WI_LL B_E-LOST _ TO LOSS OF HYDRAULIC PUMP.
_TI_TY IS 2/IR FOR LOSS OF ONE APU AND/OR HYDRAULIC SYSTEM.
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 1/1 FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE
LOSS OF ANO_ F,_AI_ _GINE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 107 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GAS GENERATOR BED HEATER
FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
APU
POWER SYSTEM
GAS GENERATOR BED HEATER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: BROKEN WIRE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FOR KEEPING GAS GENERATOR BED WARM WHILE APU
IS INACTIVE. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR FOR DEORBIT BECAUSE LOSS OF
BOTH HEATERS COULD CAUSE ONE APU TO BE LOST, AND LOSS OF ANOTHER
APU WOULD BE A CRITICAL SITUATION.
ABORT: FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT WHILE APU IS RUNNING.
REFERENCES:
L
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/22/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 108
ITEM: GAS GENERATOR BED HEATER
FAILURE MODE: GAS LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
APU
POWER SYSTEM
GAS GENERATOR BED HEATER
_ITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_ _ _-- ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREATES VERY LIMITED LIFETIME FOR BOTH A AND B HEATER.
CRITICALITY IS 3/3 BECAUSE SECOND HEATER IS NOT LOST UNTIL A .....
CERTAIN LENGTH OF TIME AFTER IT IS ACTIVATED; IT IS USABLE FOR
APU DEORBIT STARTUP.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/22/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 109
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: GAS GENERATOR BED HEATER
FAILURE MODE: SHORT CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
POWER SYSTEM
GAS GENERATOR BED HEATER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 313
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HEATER IS LOST WHEN HEATER POWER FUSE BLOWS. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY.
CRITICALITY IS 3/IR FOR DEORBIT BECAUSE LOSS OF BOTH HEATERS
COULD CAUSE ONE APU TO BE LOST, AND LOSS OF ANOTHER APU WOULD BE
A CRITICAL SITUATION.
REFERENCES:
w
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODEs
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
ii0 ABORT:
GAS GENERATOR BED HEATER THERMOSTAT
FAIL OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POWER SYSTEM
GAS GENERATOR BED HEATER
THERMOSTAT
CRITI_TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORB IT: 3/ IR ATO: 3/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT C0MPARTME_
ME360-0017-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION :
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF BACKUP CONTROL OF GAS GENERATOR BED HEATERS. IF HEATERS
ARE LOST FOR ORBIT STAY, APU___; CRITICALITY _S 3/!R
DUE TO HEATER _ONTROL REDUNDANCY AND APU REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
iii ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GAS GENERATOR BED HEATER THERMOSTAT
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
POWER SYSTEM
GAS GENERATOR BED HEATER
THERMOSTAT
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING=
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME360-0017-0001
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: "3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GAS GENERATOR BED HEATERS WILL BE STUCK ON WHILE ACTIVATED;
AUTOMATIC CONTROL WILL BE LOST. HEATERS CAN BE DEACTIVED,
HOWEVER.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-13
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/18/86 HIGHEST _ITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
112 ABORT:
ITEM: MAGNETIC PICKUP UNIT 1
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT, OR INTERMITTENT 0UT _P[JT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. _S
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
1/i
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) APU
2) POWER SYSTEM
3) MPU i
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
.... CI_I_TICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/I
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ I] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT ..............
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001 __-_iA_ _ - .....
CAUSES: OPEN CIRCUIT DUE TO MANF. DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE, OR
MECHANICAL SHO_. SHORT TO GROUND DUE TO CONTAMINATION OR
MOISTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _:_-_ :__!_ _ :_ .... _ _'_ _ _ :! .............
GIVES FA_E _ATION OF _DERSP_' WILL PRODUCE UNDERSPEED
ALARM AND APU SHUTDOWN (IF AUTOMATIC SHUTDOWN IS ENABLED). APU
CAN BE RESTARTED IF AUTOMATIC SHUTDO_ IS INHIBITED.
CRITICALITY IS 2/!_ DUE TO LOSS OF APU. ABORT: CRITICALITY IS
i/i FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN
ENGINE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/18/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 113
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM: MAGNETIC PICKUP UNIT 2
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) POWER SYSTEM
3) -MPU 2
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: OPEN CIRCUIT DUE TO MANF. DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE, OR
MECHANICAL SHOCK. SHORT TO GROUND DUE TO CONTAMINATION OR
MOISTURE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INDICATES SPEED <113% TO COMPARATOR 2; NO EFFECT WHILE APU IS IN
NORMAL SPEED. IF APU IS TAKEN TO HIGH SPEED (113%) COMPARATOR 1
WILL CONTROL AT SECONDARY SPEED (115%).
CRITICALITY IS 3/IR BECAUSE SITUATION IS 2 FAILURES AWAY FROM
CRITICAL (COMPARATOR 3+ ANOTHER APU). ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/1R
FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS BECAUSE SITUATION IS 1 FAILURE AWAY FROM
CRITICAL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 114 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: MAGNETIC PICKUP UNIT 3
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) POWER SYSTEM
s) 3
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
C[P]
LOCATION_ AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: OPEN CIRCUIT DUE TO MANF. DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE, OR
MECHANI_ SHOCK. SHORT TO GROUND DUE TO CONTAMINATION OR .
MOIS . ....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..............
INDICATES SPEED <103% TO COMPARATOR 3. APU SHIFTS TO HIGH SPEED
(113%) AS COMPARATOR 2 TAKES OVER. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR BECAUSE
SITUATION IS 2 FAILURES AWAY FROM CRITICAL (COMP_TOR 2 + .....
COMPARATOR 1 FAILURES CAN PRODUCE UNCONTROLLED OVERSPEED,
STRU_L FA_URE OF TURBINE, SHRAPNEL DAMAGE IN AFT
COMMPARTMENT, FIRE HAZARD). ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR
ENGINE-OUT ABORTS BECAUSE ONE MORE FAILURE (COMPARATOR 2) CAN
CAUSE LOSS OF AN APU AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 115 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL TANK
RUPTURE AT OPERATING PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL TANK
5)
6)
8)
e)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC282-0084-0100
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT. HANDLING DAMAGE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
I) LOSS OF FUEL-LOSS OF ONE APU, 2) SHRAPNEL DAMAGE'IN AFT
COMPARTMENT, 3) FUEL IN AFT COMPARTMENT - FIRE HAZARD, HARDWARE
CRITICALITY IS 1 DUE TO SHRAPNEL AND FIRE HAZARD
FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY IS 1 DUE TO FIRE HAZARD. SCREEN C:
RUPTURE OF APU 1 FUEL TANK CAN CAUSE SHRAPNEL DAMAGE TO APU 2
FUEL TANK AND VICEVERSA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 116
ITEM: FUEL TANK
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK (FUEL)
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES
HIGHEST _ITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 1/1
ABORT: i/1
SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL TANK
4) SHELL
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITI_TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: i/1
LI FTO FF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 1/I
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/I
m_DmrOANcY sc_m_s: A [NA ] S [HA ] C [HA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC282-0084-0100
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE WELD MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
i) LOSS OF FUEL-LOSS OF ONE APU, 2) FUEL IN AFT COMPARTMENT-FIRE
HAZARD. CRITICALITY IS i/! DUE _ FIRE _Z_. _ _i i
REFERENCES z
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 117 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
_LTANK
E_AL LEAK (GN2)
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL TANK
4) SHELL
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 1/1
QNORBIT: 2/IR AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: I/I
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A[ 1 ]
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC282-0084-0100
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
i) LOSS OF FUEL PRESSURE, 2) LOSS OF APU. CRITICALITY IS 2/IR
DUE TO _SS OF ONE APU. A_ RT:_ _ITICALITY IS i/i FOR ENGINE-OUT
ABORTS DUE_TO _POSSIB_ LOSS OF_ANOTHER MAIN ENGI_, ........
m REFERENCES :
m
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-19
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
INDEPENDE_ORBITER_SESSME_
O_ITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WO_S_ET
8/19/86 HIG_ST _ITI_ITY HDW/_C
FLIG_: 2/IR
118 _RT: i/I
_L T_
I_E_ _ T_OUGH DI_GM
_D _YST: J. _S S_SYS _D: 3. _S
B__ HIE_C_:
I) APU
2) _L SYSTEM
3) _EL T_
4) DI_GM
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
_ITI_ITIES
F_G_ P_E HDW/_ _ ..... _ORT HDW/_C
P__: 3/3 RT_: i/1
LI_OFF: 2/IR T_: i/1
ONO_IT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEO_IT: 2/1R ATO: 1/1
_DING/SAFING: 2/IR .......
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ I] B[P] C [ P]
_TION: _ COMP_TME_ !
P_T _BER: MC282-0084-0100
_USES: _FAC_ING DEFEr, _DLING DA_GE, INST_TION
E_OR, FATIG_ FAIL_
EFFECTS/_TION_ :
I) MIG_TION OF _EL I_O G_, _D VICEVERSA, 2) DE_SED _EL
T_ P_SS_[ _SSIBT._ _SS _F _ (IF __ DENSE IS
G_T _OUGH). _ITI_LI_ IS 2/IR D_ TO _SS OF O_ APU.
_ORT: _ITI_I_ IS 1/1 FOR _GI_-O_ _RTS, D_ TO POSSIBT._
_SS OF _OT_R _IN ENGINE.
_FE_NCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 119 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
1/1
ITEM: FUEL TANK GN2 LINE
FAILURE MODE: LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL TANK GN2 LINE
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: I/i
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
V070-465203
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING, INSTALLATION ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
i) LOSS OF FUEL PRESSURE, 2) LOSS OF APU. CRITICALITY IS 2/1R
DUE TO LOSS OF ONE APU. ABORT: CRITICALITY IS I/i FOR ENGINE-
OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-21
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
i20 ABORT:
FUEL TANK GN2 FILL COUPLING
EXTERNAL LEAK
HDW/nmC
2/1R
1/1
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL TANK GN2 LINE
4) GN2 FILL COUPLING
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 1/I
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
APU SERVICE PANEL
ME276-0030-0017
CAUSES:_FACTURING DEFECT_HANDLING DAMAgE,_gQ_INATIQN,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
1)LOSS OF FUEL PRESSURE, 2) LOSS OF APU. CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE
TO LOSS OF ONE APU_ _ .........._:_,......._i=:_==--= _ _i_:_ ..............= ...........
ABORT: CRITICALLY IS i/i FOR ENGI_E--6UT _SRTS_ DUE _TO POSSIBLE
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 121 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL TANK GN2 FILL COUPLING
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL TANK GN2 LINE
4) GN2 FILL COUPLING
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: APU SERVICE PANEL
PART NUMBER: ME276-0030-0017
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT SERVICE FUEL TANK; POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-23
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM: FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST:
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
i0/06/8' HIG_ST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
122 ABORT:
J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
APU
FUEL SYSTEM
FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3./3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ i] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
ME284-0558-000X
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, OPEN OR SHORT COIL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANT VALVE ALLOWS FUEL TO REACH APU; NO EFFECT. CRITICALITY
IS 3/IR DUE TO REDUNDANCY OF APU'S AND OF FUEL TANK ISOLATION
VALVES. FAILURE CANNOT OCCUR AFTER APU START.
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WINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
123 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE
FAILS TO CLOSE (STUCK OPEN) _ INTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
FUEL SYSTEM
FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME284-0558-000X
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECONDARY FUEL VALVE PROVIDES REDUNDANT SHUTOFF OF FUEL; NO
EFFECT. CRITICALITY IS 3/2R DUE TO REDUNDANCY OF APU'S AND OF
FUEL SHUTOFF VALVES. IF FUEL COULD NOT BE SHUT OFF, TURBINE
WOULD RUN AWAY AND COME APART.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-25
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 124 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM: FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONO_IT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME284-0558-000X
CAUSES: SHORT OR OPEN CIRCUIT IN COIL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUNDANT VALVE ALLOWS FUEL TO REACH APU; NO EFFECT. CRITICALITY
IS 3/IR DUE TO REDUNDANCY OF APU'S AND OF FUEL TANK ISOLATION
VALVES. -- ..... _ _ _---_ ...... _ _....... _ - -
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/1R FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS, WHERE LOSS OF
ONE APU CAN BE CRITICAL.
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 125 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM: FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE
FAILURE MODE: BARRIER LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FUEL SYSTEM
FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1
LIFTOFF: i/I
ONORBIT: 2/1R
DEORBIT: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
CRITICALITIES
ABORT
RTLS:
TA_:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME284-0558-000X
B [NA ] C [NA ]
.CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, FATIGUE FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE SHORT CIRCUIT IN SOLENOID COIL OR RUPTURE OF VALVE DUE
TO HYDRAZINE DECOMPOSITION: EXTERNAL FUEL LEAK. CRITICALITY IS
I/i FOR FUEL LEAK DUE TO FIRE HAZARD.
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-27
DATE: -
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
126 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
1/1_
ITEM: FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS _: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
APU
FUEL SYSTEM
FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
1/1 RTLS:
1/1 TAL:
2/IR AOA:
1/1 ATO:
1/1
A [NA ] B [NA ]
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/1 _
1/1
C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COM"PARTMENT .....
PART NUMBER: ME284-0558-000X
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DE?ECT, INSTALLATION ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUEL IN_FT_TMENT: FiRE HAZARD.
FIRE HAZARD.- _ ....
CRITICALITY IS I/i DUE TO
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
127 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE
FAILS TO RELIEVE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
APU
FUEL SYSTEM
FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
2/IR AOAt 3/3
2/1R ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME284-0558-000X
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT UNLESS REDUNDANT VALVE°ALSO FAILS TO RELIEVE; IF SO,
POSSIBLE LINE RUPTURE AND FUEL LEAK-FIRE HAZARD. CRITICALITY IS
2/IR DUE TO VALVE REDUNDANCY. FAILURE CANNOT OCCUR WHILE APU IS
OPERATING.
REFERENCES:
w
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 128 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/1
ITEM: FUEL PUMP
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LEAK PAST FACE SEAL
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL PUMP
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITI_ITIES
FLIGHT P_E HDW/_C ........ _RT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: i/i TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/i •
B [NA ] C [NA ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
= ,
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF FACE SEAL IS WORN OR DAMAGED AND ALLOWS METAL-TO-METAL CONTACT
IN ADDITION TO LEAK, HEAT SOURCE CAN CAUSE FUEL DETONATION; APU
IS LOST AND F_L IS _ASED INTO _ C__PARTMENT CAUSING FIRE _
HAZARD.
IF NO METAL-TO-METAL CONTACT IS INVOLVED, LEAK SHOULD BE HANDLED
BY SEAL CAVITY DRAIN SYS_-M. ....._TCH BOT_ FIL_ _D RELIEVES
OV_OARD, HYDRAZINE MAY BE INGESTED _O _ COMP_NT T_OUGH
VENT DOORS. CRITICALITY IS i/I DUE TO FIRE HAZARD.
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/10/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 129
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/1
ITEM: FUEL PUMP
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL PUMP
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOAz
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
i/i
I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT IN SEAL OR COUPLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
i) LOSS OF FUEL - POSSIBLE LOSS OF ONE APU, 2) FUEL IN AFT
COMPARTMENT-FIRE HAZARD. CRITICALITY IS i/i DUE TO FIRE HAZARD.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-31
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 130 ABORT:
ITEM: FUEL PUMP
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT OR LOW OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/1
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL PUMP
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUN_C .......... ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 1/1
ONORB IT: 2/ 1R AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING :" 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC201-0001
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT POWER, INTERNAL LEAKAGE, JAMMING OR
BINDING, CHECK VALVE OR R_"LI_F VALVE FAILS OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF OUTPUT IS LOW ENOUGH, APU WILL SHUT DOWN. CRITICALITY IS 2/!R
DUE TO LOSS OF ONE APU. ABORT: CRITICALITY IS I/I FOR ENGINE-OUT
ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 131 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: FUEL PUMP BYPASS VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL PUMP
4) BYPASS VALVE
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
APU WILL NOT START IF FAILURE OCCURS WHILE APU IS SHUT DOWN.
FAILURE IS NOT CREDIBLE WHILE APU IS RUNNING. CRITICALITY IS
2/IR DUE TO LOSS OF ONE APU. PRELAUNCH: WILL LEAD TO LAUNCH
SCRUB.
ABORT: FAILURE IS NOT CREDIBLE WHILE APU IS RUNNING.
REFERENCES: NO DESIGN DATA WAS OBTAINED FOR THIS VALVE.
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-33
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSEssMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/11/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 132
ITEM: FUEL PUMP BYPASS VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT •
SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL PUMP
4) BYPASS VALVE
s)
s)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
HDW/_C .... ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/3 TAL:
3/3 AOA:
2/IR ATO:
2/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
2/1R
A[I] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC20i-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION , CORROSION .... _ _ _ _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF APU IS RUNNING, FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT. IF APU IS SHUT
DOWN, IT WILL NOT START. APU WILL BE LOS_T. - CRITICALITY I S 2/!R
DUE TO LOSS OF ONE APU.- ......' .....
PRELAUNCH: NO EFFECT UNTIL APU STARTUP; THEN, WILL CAUSE LAUNCH
SCRUB. ABORT: NO EFFECT ON OPERATING APU. IF APU IS SHUT DOWN,
IT CANNOT BE RESTARTED.
REFERENCES: NO DESIGN DATA WAS OBTAINED FOR THIS VALVE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/11/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 133
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP RELIEF VALVE
RELIEVES AT LOW PRESSURE/FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL PUMP
4) RELIEF VALVE
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC201-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, MECHANICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COULD DIVERT FUEL PUMP OUTPUT FROM GAS GENERATOR LEADING TO
DEGRADED APU PERFORMANCE OR APUSHUTDOWN. CRITICALITY IS 2/IR
DUE TO LOSS OF APU. ABORT: CRITICALITY IS I/I FOR ENGINE-OUT
ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-35
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
134 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMPRELIEF VALVE
FAILS TO RELIEVE ....
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HiE_CHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL PUMP
4) RELIEF VALVE
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
_ITICALITIES
HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
3/IR TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
3/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/1R
A[2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, CORROSION .....
EFFECTS/RATiONALE:
FLOW RESTRICTION DOWNSTREAM OF PUMP CAN CAUSE PRESSURE RISE -
WITHOUT RELIEF, PRESSURE COULD FORCE FUEL INTO FUEL PUMP SEAL
_Vi_=_- POSSIBLY INT_ THE' _?2tRBOX, _ _OX _ICATION COULD
BE DEGRADED, LEADING TO OV_TING AND LOSS OF APU.
CRIT_CU_TY IS 3/_=(o_ FAILURE AWAY _aoM LOSS OF O_ APU).
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/1R FOR ENGI_-O_ ABORTS, WHERE LOSS OF
ONE _ _ _ _ITI_I_
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
135 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP RELIEF VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL PUMP
4) RELIEF VALVE
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: i/i TAL:
ONORB IT: 2/ IR AOA:
'DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, INSTALLATION ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUEL LEAK INTO AFT COMPARTMENT - FIRE HAZARD.
1/1 DUE TO FIRE HAZARD.
CRITICALITYY IS
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-37
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WOR/_SHEET
DATE: i0/0 i/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 136 ABORT:
ITEM: FUEL PUMPFILTER
FAILURE MODE: BLOCKAGE _
LEAD ANALYST: J. _S SUBSYS _: J. BARNES
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
1/1
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL PUMP
4) FILTER
s)
v)
s)
9)
_ITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE H_W/?UNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC201-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF BLOCKAGE IS SEVERE, APU WILL BE STARVED OF FUEL AND WILL SHUT
DOWN. CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE TO LOSS OF AN APU. ABORT:
CRITICALITY IS I/I FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBILITY OF
LOSING ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 137 ABORT:
ITEM: FUEL PUMP FILTER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN-NO FILTERING
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL PUMP
4) FILTER
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF:" 3/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: HANDLING DAMAGE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ANY CONTAMINATION PRESENT WOULD PASS INTO FUEL VALVES AND GAS
GENERATOR; COULD CAUSE APU TO SHUT DOWN IF VALVE FAILED CLOSED OR
GAS GENERATOR OBSTRUCTED. CRITICALITY IS 3/1R DUE TO POSSIBLE
LOSS OF ONE APU IF CONTAMINATION IS PRESENT.
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS, WHERE LOSS OF
ONE APU CAN BE CRITICAL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-39
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDACID: 138 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/1
1/1
ITEM: FUEL PUMP DRAIN COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL PUMP
4) DRAIN COUPLING
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_UNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/I RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBiT: 2/IR AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1 ........
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT -
EFFECTS/RATiONALE:
i) LOSS OF FUEL-POSSIBLE LOSS OF ONE APU. 2) FUEL IN AFT
COMPARTMENT-FIRE HAZARD. CRITICALITY IS i/i DUE TO FIRE HAZARD.
PRELA_: NO FUEL IS PRESENT IN PUMP_XL_ FUEL T_VALVES
ARE OPENED FOR STARTUP.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
139 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CLOSED
PRIMARY FUEL VALVE
FAILS TO CLOSE (STUCK OPEN); FAILS TO REMAIN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) PRIMARY FUEL VALVE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHORTED OR OPEN SOLENOID COIL,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
APU RUNS AT HIGH SPEED (113%) ON SECONDARY FUEL VALVE (COMPARATOR
2). CRITICALITY IS 3/IR DUE TO REDUNDANCY OF CONTROL VALVES AND
APUIS.
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE
LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-41
INDEPENDENTORBITER _SESSME_
O_ITER SUBSYSTEM _YSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: A_
MDAC ID: 140
HIG_ST CRITICALITY
F_G_:
_RT:
ITEM:
F_L_ MODE:
P_Y _L V_VE
FAI_ TO OPEN (S_CK C_SED)
_YST: J. _S SUBSYS _: J. _S
HDW/_C
2/IR
i/I
B__ HIE__:
i) APU
2) _L SYSTEM
3) PRIVY _L VALVE
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
_ITI_ITIES
F_G_ P_E HDW/_C _RT HDW/_C
P__: 3/ 3 RT_: 1/1
•.7_OFFz 2/1R T_: 1/1
ONO_ IT: 2/ IR AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: i/1
_DING/S_ING: 2/1R
_DUND_CY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
_TION: _ COMP_TME_
P_T _BER: MC201-0001
_USES: CO_INATION
EFFE_S/_TION_:
WIT.T. S_ _ D_ TO _L ST_VATION. _ITI_I_ IS 2/1R
DUE TO LOSS OF _ APU.
_ORT: _ITI__ IS i/I FOR _GI_-O_ _ORTS D_ TO POSSIBT_
_SS OF _O_ _IN _GI_.
_FE_CES :
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
141 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM: PRIMARY FUEL VALVE
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LEAK TO OUTLET
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) PRIMARY FUEL VALVE
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, FATIGUE FAILURE OF SEAT,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ALLOWS FUEL PAST PRIMARY VALVE TO SECONDARY FUEL VALVE AND GAS
GENERATOR; AT WORST, SECONDARY VALVE WILLTAKE OVER AND CONTROL
APU AT HIGH SPEED (113%). CRITICALITY IS 3/IR DUE TO REDUNDANCY
IN CONTROL VALVES AND APUIS.
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE
LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-43
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 142 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
1/1
ITEM: PRIMARY FUEL VALVE
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LEAK TO BYPASS
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
U
I
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BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) PRIMARY FUEL VALVE
4)
5) -,
6)
7)
8)
9) "
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC --
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: i/1 m
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
B [ P] C [ P]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, FATIGUE FAILURE OF SEAT,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIVERTS FUEL FROM GAS GENERATOR BACK TO FUEL PUMP INLET; AT
WORST, APU WILL SHUT DOWN DUE TO FUEL STARVATION. CRITICALITY IS
2/IR DUE TO LOSS OF APU.
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS I/i FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE
LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBS YSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 143 ABORT:
HDW/ C
1/1
1/1
ITEM: PRIMARY FUEL VALVE
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL BARRIER LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) PRIMARY FUEL VALVE
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I/1 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT CIRCUIT IN THE COIL; LOSS OF VALVE FUNCTION. VALVE WILL BE
FAILED OPEN. APU WILL RUN AT HIGH SPEED (113%) ON SECONDARY FUEL
VALVE. FUEL PRESSURE WILL CAUSE FUEL LEAK TO AFT COMPARTMENT-
FIRE HAZARD. POSSIBLE FUEL DETONATION.
CRITICALITY IS i/I DUE TO FIRE HAZARD.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-45
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT: 1/1
MDAC ID: 144 ABORT: 1/1
ITEM: PRIMARY FUEL VALVE
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
J
z
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m
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) PRIMARY FUEL VALVE
4) i
5)
6)
8) m
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUEL IN AFT COMPARTMENT NEAR IGNITION SOURCE (HEAT) - FIRE
HAZARD. CRITICALITY IS I/I DUE TO FIRE HAZARD.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 145 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
211R
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SECONDARY FUEL VALVE
FAILS TO OPEN; FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) SECONDARY FUEL VALVE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHORTED OR OPEN SOLENOID COIL,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
APU SHUTS DOWN DUE TO FUEL STARVATION. CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE
TO LOSS OF APU.
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS I/I FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE
LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE.
REFERENCES:
E
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-47
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
m
i
DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 146 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: SECONDARY FUEL VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNESLEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES
w
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) APU w
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) SECONDARY FUEL VALVE
4) u
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/ IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC201-0001
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
B[P] C[P]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT UNLESS APU IS TAKEN TO HIGH SPEED (113%); THEN, PRIMARY
VALVE WILL TAKE OVER AT 115% (COMPARATOR 3). CRITICALITY IS 3/IR
DUE TO CONTROL VALVE AND APU REDUNDANCY.
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS WHERE ONE APU
LOSS CAN BE CRITICAL.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
147 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SECONDARY FUEL VALVE
FAILS MID-POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) SECONDARY FUEL VALVE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUEL FROM PRIMARY VALVE CAN REACH GAS GENERATOR THROUGH SECONDARY
VALVE REGARDLESS OF PRIMARY VALVE POSITION; RESULT IS
UNCONTROLLED APU OVERSPEED, AND APUAUTOMATIC SHUTDOWN AT 129%
(IF AUTO SHUTDOWN IS ENABLED). TURBINE WILL GO BEYOND 129% USING
FUELREMAINING DOWNSTREAM OF TANK ISOLATION VALVES - MAY COME
APART. CRITICALITY IS I/I DUE TO SHRAPNEL DAMAGE EFFECTS IN AFT
COMPARTMENT.
w REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-49
I_EP_DE_ O_ITER _SESSME_
O_ITER SUBSYSTEM _YSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 10/07/86 HIG_ST CRITI _ITY
SUBSYSTEM: _ F_G_:
MDAC ID" 148 _RT:
ITEM: SECO_Y _L V_VE
F_L_ MODE: I__ _ TO O_T_T
HDW/_C
3/!R
2/IR
_YST: J. _S SUBSYS _: J. _S
B__ HIE__:
I) APU
2) _L SYSTEM
3) SECONDLY _L V_VE
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
_ITI_TIES
FLIG_ P_E HDW/_C
P__: 3/3
LIFTOFF" 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEO_IT: 3/IR
_DING/S_ING: 3/IR
_RT HDW/_JNC
RT_: 2/IR
T_: 2/IR
AOA: 2/IR
AT0: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
_TION: _ COMP_E_
P_T _BER: MC201-0001
B[P] C[P]
_USES: CO_INATION, _FA_ING DEFEr, FATIG_ FAIL_ OF
V_VE S_T
EFFE_S/_TION_:
NO EFFE_ _v_SS _ T_ _ HIGH SPEED (113%); _, IN WORST
_E, _I_Y V_VE _T.T. _ OV_ AT 115% (COMP_TOR 3).
_ITI__ IS 3/!R _ TO COBOL V_VE _ _ _D_D_CY.
A_RT: _ITI__ IS 2/IR FOR ENGI_-O_ _RTS _ O_
_SS _ BE _ITI_
_FE_NCES:
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
149 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
21ZR
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES
SECONDLYn_L VALVE
INTm_AL _ TO BYP_S
.....S_SYS _: #. a_'_ES....
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) SECONDARY FUEL VALVE
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
_ITI_ITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: ccPj
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC201-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, FATIGUE FAILURE OF
VALVE SEAT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUEL IS DIVERTED FROM GAS GENERATOR TO PUMP INLET. IN WORST
CASE, APU MAY SHUT DOWN DUE TO UNDERSPEED. CRITICALITY IS 2/1R
DUE TO LOSS OF APU.
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS i/I FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE
LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-51
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
150 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SECONDARYFUELVALVE
E_E_ALLEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) SECONDARY FUEL VALVE
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS" A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES : MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFE CTS/RAT IONALE :
FUEL IN AFT COMPARTMENT NEAR IGNITION SOURCE (HEAT) - FIRE
HAZARD. CRITICALITY IS i/i DUE TO FIRE HAZARD.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 151 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL LINE-UPSTREAM OF TANK ISOL VALVES
EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL LINE
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: V070-465XXX
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
I) LOSS OF FUEL-LOSS OF ONE APU. 2) FUEL IN AFT COMPARTMENT-FIRE
HAZARD. CRITICALITY IS i/i DUE TO FIRE HAZARD.
L
w
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12110186 C-53
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/27/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 152 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/I
i/i
ITEM: FUEL LINE-DOWNSTREAM OF TANK ISOL VALVES
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL LINE
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/I
LIFTOFF: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART _BER: V070-465XXX
CRITI_ITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 1/1
TAL: i/i
AOA: i/1
ATO: 1/1
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE
ErFECTS/RATZON :
i) LOSS OF FUEL-LOSS OF ONE APU. 2) FUEL IN AFT COMPARTMENT-FIRE
HAZARD. CRITICALITY IS !/IDU E TO FIRE _Z_. _
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g
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: lo/3o/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 153
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/i-
ITEM: FUEL TANK HYDRAZINE FILL COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL LINES
4) FILL COUPLING
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: I/i
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
APU SERVICE PANEL
ME276-0030-0015
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUEL LEAKS OUT, ESCAPES TO OUTSIDE AROUND APU SERVICE PANEL.
SOME FUEL COULD BE INGESTED INTO AFT COMPARTMENT THROUGH VENT
DOOR 8 DURING ENTRY (FIRE HAZARD). APU IS LOST DUE TO LOSS OF
FUEL. CRITICALITY IS i/i FOR ENTRY, DUE TO FIRE HAZARD.
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS I/i FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS, WHERE LOSS OF
ONE APU CAN BE CRITICAL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-55
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/08/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 154
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: FUEL TANK HYDRAZINE FILL COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL LINES
4) FILL COUPLING
S)
6)
8)
9)
FLIGHT _SE
PRELAUNCH:
L_:
ONORBIT"
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/nmC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
A [NA ]
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SERVICE PANEL
ME276-0030-_15
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKAGE, _CO_AMINATION
E FECTS/RATIONA :
CANNOT SERVICE FUEL TANK; POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY.
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 155 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
I/i
ITEM: FUEL LINE TEST POINT COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL LINES
4) TEST POINT COUPLING
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
APU SERVICE PANEL
ME276-0032-0025
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION, HANDLING DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FUEL; IF APU OPERATING, FUEL COULD BE DEPLETED, APU WOULD
BE LOST. NO LEAK IS POSSIBLE BEFORE FUEL TANK VALVES ARE OPENED
FOR APU START, EXCEPT FOR RESIDUAL FUEL IN LINE. FUEL ESCAPES
AROUND APU SERVICE PANEL, MAY BE INGESTED INTO AFT
COMPARTMENT THROUGH VENT DOOR 8 DURING ENTRY (FIRE HAZARD).
CRITICALITY IS I/I FOR ENTRY DUE TO FIRE HAZARD. ABORT:
CRITICALITY IS I/i FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS, WHERE LOSS OF ONE APU
CAN BE CRITICAL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-57
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET_
DATE: 9/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: - 156 ABORT:
ITEM: FUEL LINE TEST POINT COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL LINES
4) TEST POINT COUPLING
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: APU SERVICE PANEL
PART NUMBER: ME276-0032-0025
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION ......
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON STANDARD TURNAROUND ACTIVITIES.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/08/86
_U
157
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: I/1
ABORT: i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL LINE FLEX HOSE
LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL LINES
4) FLEX HOSE
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: i/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT" 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME271-0079-58XX
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
1) LOSS OF FUEL TO APU. 2) FUEL IN AFT COMPARTMENT-FIRE HAZARD.
CRITICALITY IS i/I DUE TO FIRE HAZARD.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-59
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/08/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: -158
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL LINE HIGH POINT BLEED COUPLING
EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL LINES
4) HIGH POINT BLEED COUPLING
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
1/1 RTLS: 1/1
1/i TAL: i/I_
3/_ AOA: i/1
1/1 ATO: 1/1
B [NA ] C [NA ]
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
COMPART_
ME276-0032-0027
CAUSES:
ERROR
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE , INSTALLATION _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
I) LOSS OF FUEL-LOSS OF ONE A_. 2) I_L IN _ COMPARTME_-FiRE
HAZARD. CRITICALITY IS I/I DUE TO FIRE HAZARD.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/08/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 159
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: FUEL LINE HIGH POINT BLEED COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
APU
FUEL SYSTEM
FUEL LINES
HIGH POINT BLEED COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/ 3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME276-0032-0027
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FILTER BLOCKAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT PERFORM HYDRAZINE SERVICING-POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY.
REFERENCES :
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-61
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 160 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: FUEL TANK HEATER
(IIA, liB, 12A, 12B, 21A, 21B, 22A, 22B, 31A, 31B, 32A, 32B)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OFF, OR LOW OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL TANK HEATER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: _/_
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LAB_D_/SAFING" 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC363-0025-0001
CAUSES: BROKEN WIRE, THERMOSTAT FAIL OPEN, SHORT CIRCUIT,
INSTALLATION ERROR
EFFECTS/RATION;iLEz .......
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FOR HEATING FUEL TANK. IF BOTH HEATERS ARE
LOST, FUEL CAN FREEZE AND APU MAY BE LOST. CRITICALITY IS 3/1R
FOR DEORBIT: 2 FAILURES AWAY FROM CRITICAL (I MORE HEATER + 1
MORE APU).
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 161 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: FUEL TANK HEATER THERMOSTAT (SIIA, SIIB, S21A,
S21B, S31A, S31B)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL TANK HEATER
4) THERMOSTAT
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME360-0017-0005
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT _L TANK HEATERS. CRITICALITY IS 3/1R FOR
DEORBIT: 2 FAILURES AWAY FROM CRITICAL (i MORE HEATER + 1 MORE
APU).
REFERENCES:
ram*
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-63
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/23/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 162
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FUEL TANK HEATER THERMOSTAT (SIIA, SIIB, S21A,
S21B, S31A, S31B)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL TANK HEATER
4) THERMOSTAT
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
ME360-0017-0005
CAUSES: SHORT, WELDED CONTACTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECTED HEATER SET (A OR B)
SWITCHED OFF.
IS FAILED ON WHEN ACTIVE, BUT CAN BE
g
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REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 163 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: FUEL LINE HEATER
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OFF, OR LOW OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL LINE HEATER
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: . 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: BROKEN WIRE, THERMOSTAT FAILED OPEN, SHORT CIRCUIT,
INSTALLATION ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FOR HEATING FUEL LINES. IF BOTH HEATERS LOST,
FUEL CAN FREEZE AND APU MAY BE LOST. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR FOR
DEORBIT: 2 FAILURES AWAY FROH CRITICAL (I MORE HEAT + 1 MORE
APU).
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-65
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 164 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: FUEL LINE HEATERTHERMOSTAT
(SI6A,SI6B,SII2A, SII2B,SIIA,SIIB, S26A,S26B,S212A, S212B,S21A,S21B,
S36A,S36B,S312A,S312B,S31A, S31B)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. B_E_
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL LINE HEATER
4) THERMOSTAT
5)
6)
7)
8)
CRITICALITIES
FLIC_PHASE HDW/_C ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME360-00IT-OOOX
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/1R
C[P]
LOSS OF REDUNDANT FUEL LINE HEATERS. CRITICALITY IS 311R FOR
DEORBIT:2 _AILURESAWAY FROM CRITICAL (1MORE SEATER + i MORE
APU).
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 165 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: FUEL LINEHEATERTHERMOSTAT
(SI6A,SI6B,SII2A, SlI2B,SlIA,SIIB,S26A,S26B,S212A,S212B,S21A, S21B,
S36A,S36B,S312A, S312B,S31A, S31B)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL LINE HEATER
4) THERMOSTAT
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
ME360-0017-OOOX
CAUSES: SHORT, WELDED CONTACTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECTED HEATER SET (A OR B) IS FAILED ON WHEN ACTIVE, BUT CAN BE
SWITCHED OFF.
E
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-67
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/24/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 166
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: FUEL LINE HEATER THERMOSTAT (REDUNDANT)
(SI9A, S!9B_SI4A,SI4B, S29A,S29B,S24A,S24B,S39A,S39B,S34A,S34B)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN ...........
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
APU
FUEL SYSTEM
FUEL LINE HEATER
THERMOSTAT (REDUNDANT)
SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAF!NG: 3/IR
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME360-0017-OOOX
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
B [NA ] C [ P ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: :_
NO EFFECT EXCEPT LOSS OF _OSTAT REDUNDANCY. CRITICALITY IS
3/IR FOR DE ORBIT: IP ALL THERMOSTA_Si_AIL OPiNe FUEL LINES_9,N
FREEZE, POSSIBLY LEADING TO FREEZING AND FUEL LEAK.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-68 :
am
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 167 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FUEL LINE HEATER THERMOSTAT (REDUNDANT)
(SIgA,SI9B,SI4A, SI4B,S29A, S29B,S24A,S24B,S39A,S39B,S34A,S34B)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL LINE HEATER
THERMOSTAT (REDUNDANT)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME360-0017-OOOX
CAUSES: SHORT, WELDED CONTACTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECTED HEATER SET (A OR B) IS FAILED ON WHEN ACTIVE, BUT CAN BE
SWITCHED OFF.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-69
INDEP_DENT O_ITER _SESSME_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_HEET
DATE: 9/24/86 HIG_ST _ITI_I_
SUBSYSTEM: A_ FLIG_:
MDAC ID: 168 _RT:
HDW/_C
311R
3/IR
ITEM: _L _MP S_L _VITY D_IN LI_ _TER
FAIL_ MODEz FAIL OFF, OR _W O_
_D _YST: J. _S SUBSYS _D: J. _S
B_O_ HIE__:
1) APU
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
_L SYSTEM
_EL _P S_ _VI_ D_N LI_ _AT_
_TI_TIES
F_G_ P_E HDW/_C _RT HDW/_C
P__: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 T_: 3/3
ONO_IT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEO_IT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
_DING/SAFING: 3/IR
_D_D_CY S_ENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ]
_T_ON: _ COMP_TM_
P_T _BER: MC363-0026-0007
_USES: BROWN WI_, _OSTAT FAIV._.D OPEN, SHORT CIR_IT,
INST_TION _OR
EFFE_S/_TION_:
_SS OF _D_D_ FOR _TING S_ _VI_ D_N LI_ ...._F _EL
_D I_O D_IN _, _ _ _TE_ _ _ST, _EL C_
_ZE _ B_ _IN. _ __ING COU_ RU_ LINE _D
_USE _L _.
_TI_TY IS 3/IR FOR DEO_IT: 2 FAIL_S AWAY _OM CRITI_ (i
MO_ _T_ + 1 MO_ _).
_FE_NCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/24/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 169
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLI GHT: 3/ IR
ABORT: 3/ IR
ITEM: FUEL PUMP SEAL CAVITY DRAIN LINE HEATERTHERMOSTAT
(SlI2A,SlI2B,S212A,S212B,S312A, S312B)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
APU
FUEL SYSTEM
FUEL PUMP SEAL CAVITY DRAIN LINE HEATER
THERMOSTAT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME360-0017-0008
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HEATER FOR HEATING DRAIN LINE. IF BOTH HEATERS
ARE LOST, FUEL CAN FREEZE AND APU MAY BE LOST. CRITICALITY IS
3/IR FOR DEORBIT: 2 FAILURES AWAY FROM CRITICAL (I MORE HEATER +
1 MORE APU).
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-71
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT: 1/1
MDAC ID: 170 ABORT: i/I
ITEM: FUEL PUMP SEAL CAVITY DRAIN LINE HEATER THERMOSTAT
(SlI2A,SII2B,S212A, S212B,S312A,S312B)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL PUMP SEAL CAVITY
4) THERMOSTAT
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
DRAIN LINE HEATER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
Liq_T_?F: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/1
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 1/1
=
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATIOn: AFT COMPARTMm 
PART NUMBER: ME360-0017-0008
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: SHORT, WELDED CONTACTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HEATER STUCK ON; IF FUEL IS PRESENT IN LINE, IT WILL OVERHEAT AND
DETONATE BEFORE FDA _. _L LEAK - FIRE HAZARD. CRITICALITY
IS I/i DUE TO FIRE HAZARD.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL RECOMMENDED CIL CHANGE 6-13-
86 (CIT. i2i9.2). ROCKWE_ I_RNATIONAL PRESENTATION "APU DRAIN
LINE HEATER SAFETY CONCERN", PRESENTED BY J.L S_?E-R, _ ....
1986.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 171 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP/VALVE HEATER
FAIL OFF, OR LOW OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL PUMP HEATER
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: BROKEN WIRE, THERMOSTAT FAILED OPEN, SHORT CIRCUIT,
INSTALLATION ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FOR HEATING FUEL PUMPAND FUEL VALVES. IF
BOTH HEATERS ARE LOST, FUEL CAN FREEZE AND APU MAY BE LOST.
CRITICALITY IS 3/1R FOR DEORBIT: 2 FAILURES AWAY FROM CRITICAL (1
MORE HEATER + 1 MORE APU).
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-73
INDEP_DE_ ORBITER _SESSME_
O_ITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_HEET
DATE: 9/24/86 HIG_ST_ITI_LITY
SUBSYSTEM: _ FLIG_:
MDAC ID: 172 _RT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: _L_P/V_VE_TER T_OSTAT
(SITA,SITB,S27A,S27B,S37A, S37B)
FAIL_ MODE: FAIL OP_
_¥ST: J. _S
B__ HItCh:
i) APU
2) _L SYSTEM
3) _L P_P/V_VE _T_
4) _OSTAT
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS T._: j. B_S
_ITi_ITIES
F_G_ _E _W/_C _RT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/2R RT_: 3/3
_OFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONO_IT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEO_IT: 3/_ ATO: 3/IR
_NG/S_ING: 3/IR
_D_D_CY S_S: A [ 1 ] B [NA ]
_TION: _ COMP_TME_
P_T _B_: ME360-0017-0001
mUSES: CO_INATION
c[P]
EFFE_S/_TION_: .........................
_SS OF _D_D_ _TE_ FOR _L _P _D _LV_-V_%_S_i_ i_:_i
_i_ITY iS 3/_FOR DEO_IT: 2 FAIL_S:AWAY _OM _ITi_ (i
MO_ _T_ + 1 MO_ _).
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/24/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 173
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/nmC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/VALVE HEATER THERMOSTAT
(S17A, SI7B, S27A, $27B, S37A, S37B)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL PUMP/VALVEHEATER
4) THERMOSTAT
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
ME360-0017-0001
CAUSES: SHORT, WELDED CONTACTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECTED HEATER SET (A OR B) IS FAILED ON WHEN ACTIVE, BUT CAN BE
SWITCHED OFF.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-75
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/08/86 H_GHESTCRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 174 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL IN-LINE FILTER
BLOCKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
1/1
SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) APu
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL IN-LINE FILTER
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITI_ITIES
FLIGHT _E HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
Li_FT_P _ 2/IR TAL: ' I/i
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC286-0051-0001
CAUSES: CONTAM INATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF APU IF BLOCKAGE IS SEVERE ENOUGH. CRITICALITY IS 2/IR
DUE TO LOSS OF ONE APU. ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 1/1 FOR ENGINE-
OUT ABORTS-DUE TO-PO_I_BL_ L0_S OF __ MAIN ENGi_E. ......_-_
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/09/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 175 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM: FUEL IN-LINE FILTER
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL IN-LINE FILTER
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
1/1 RTLS: 1/1
1/1 TAL: 1/1
3/3 AOA: I/i
1/1 ATO: 1/i
1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC286-0051-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
1) LOSS OF FUEL-LOSS OF ONE APU. 2) FUEL IN AFT COMPARTMENT-FIRE
HAZARD. CRITICALITY IS i/I DUE TO FIRE HAZARD.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-77
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 176 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL IN-LINE FILTER
FAILS OPEN-NO FILTERING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) FUEL IN-LINE FILTER
4)
5)
6)
T)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LI'FTOFF:
0NORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/!R
3/1R TAL: 2/iR
3/3" AOA: 2/IR
3/iR ATO: 2/IR
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC286-0051-000!
B [ F] C [ P]
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING ERROR, FATI_FAI_ ....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE INGESTION OF CONTAMINANTS INTO FUEL ISOLATION VALVES AND
FUEL PUMP. THIS CONTAMINATION COULD CAUSE LOSS OF APU. _
C_TICALITY _3/!_T6_OS__I?_CONTAMINATION IS
PRESENT. ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE
TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 177 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: SEAL CAVITY DRAIN LINE
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL SYSTEM
3) SEAL CAVITY DRAIN LINE
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
V070-465XXX
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
elF]
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM FUEL IN AFT COMPARTMENT (FUEL PUMP S_AL
LEAK). FUEL IN AFT COMPARTMENT IS FIRE HAZARD. CRITICALITY IS
2/1R.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-79
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID"
11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
178 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SEAL CAVITY DRAIN FLEX HOSE
EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
"t)
s)
s)
APU
FUEL SYSTEM
SEAL CAVITY DRAIN LINE
FLEX HOSE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/ 1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME271-0079-560X
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE, FATIGUE WEAR
EFFECTS/RATIO_;_ALE:
ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM FUEL IN AFT COMPARTMENT (FUEL PUMP SEAL
LEAK). = FUEL IN AFT COMPARTMENT: FI_= _ZARD. CRITICALITY _
211R.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 179 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SEAL CAVITY DRAIN LINE
BLOCKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
z)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
APU
FUEL SYSTEM
SEAL CAVITY DRAIN LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PR_LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
V070-465XXX
CAUSES: WAX FORMED BY MIXING OF LUBE OIL AND HYDRAZINE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN CASE OF A GROSS FUEL LEAK INTO THE SEAL CAVITY, SEAL CAVITY
COULD BE OVERPRESSURIZEDAND HYDRAZINE COULD BE FORCED INTO THE
GEARBOX. THIS COULD LEAD TO GEARBOX DAMAGE DUE TO INADEQUATE
LUBRICATION. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR (i FAILURE AWAY FROM APU LOSS).
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/1R FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE
LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE.
REFERENCES:
W
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-81
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT: 2/1R
MDAC ID: 180 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM: SEAL CAVITY DRAIN RELIEF VALVE
FAILURE MODE: LOW CRACKING PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
_)
8)
9)
_IE_C'rZ:
SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
APU
FUEL SYSTEM
SEAL CAVITY DRAIN RELIEF VALVE
_TICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 _ TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
.... _-/_
.2/1R
A[ i] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
_COMPARTMENT
ME284-0544-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKING FUEL WILLRELIEVE OVERBOARD AT LOWER PRESSURE; SOME FUEL
EE
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COULD BE INGESTED INTO AFT COMPARTMENT THROUGH VENT DOORS DURING
HAZARD (I FAILURE AWAY).
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INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
181 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SEAL CAVITY DRAIN RELIEF VALVE
FAILS TO RESEAT (FAILS OPEN), LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
FUEL SYSTEM
SEALCAVITY DRAIN RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA_
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME284-0544-0002
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SEAL CAVITY LEAK DETECTION, IF VALVE FAILS OPEN BEFORE
LEAK STARTS. SOME FUEL COULD BE INGESTED INTO AFT COMPARTMENT
THROUGH VENT DOORS DURING ENTRY (FIRE HAZARD). CRITICALITY IS
2/IR FOR ENTRY DUE TO FIRE HAZARD (I FAILURE AWAY).
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-83
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDACID: 182 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SEAL CAVITYDRAINRELIEF VALVE
FAILS CLOSED_ FAILS TO RELIEVE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
APU
FUEL SYSTEM
SEAL CAVITY DRAIN RELIEF VALVE _
_iTICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PREI_'NCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/!R TAL: 2_iR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
B [P] C [P]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION" AFT COMPARTM_
PART _BER: M_284-0544-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACT_NG DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATION_:
IN CASE OF A GROSS n_L _ INTO _ S_ CAVITY, _DRAZI_
COULD BE FORCED INTO _ LUBE OIL SYSTEM; RESULT COULD BE LOSS OF
APU. CRITICALITY IS 3/iR-_TWO F-AILiTRES AWAY FROM CRITICAL (FUEL
LEAK + ANOTHER APU).
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE
LOSS OF ANOT-HER MAIN ENGINE.
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
183 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SEAL CAVI_ DRAIN RELIEFVALVE
E_E_ALLEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
_)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
FUEL SYSTEM
SEAL CAVITY DRAIN LINE RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] BCF] C[F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
ME284-0544-0002
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, INSTALLATION ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF FUEL LEAKS INTO SEAL CAVITY, RESULT WILL BE FUEL IN AFT
COMPARTMENT (FIRE HAZARD). CRITICALITY IS 2/IR: 1 FAILURE AWAY
FROM CRITICAL SITUATION.
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-85
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID"
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
184 ABORT:
HDW/FU_C
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SEAL CAVITY DRAIN CATCH BOTTLE
LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIE_CHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
s)
APU
FUEL SYSTEM
SEAL CAVITY DRAIN CATCH BOTTLE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/1R
LIFT-OFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
O_O_T: 3/3 AOA: 2/ii_
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
A[ i] B[F] C[P]REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
V070-465232
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT,.......... HANDLING D_AGE
ZF  S/RATIONA', .:
A FUEL PUMP FACE SEAL LEAK WILL RESULT IN FUEL IN THE AFT
COMPARTMENT, IF THE CATCH BO_LE __LEAKS. THIS _C_TESA FIRE
HAZARD. CRITICALITY IS 2/IR: 1 FAILURE AWAY FROM CRITICAL (FUEL
PUMP FACE SEAL LEAK).
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 185
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: SEAL CAVITY DRAIN CATCH BOTTLE DRAIN VALVE
FAILURE MODE: LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
APU
FUEL SYSTEM
SEAL CAVITY DRAIN CATCH BOTTLE
DRAIN VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C OF]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
ME284-0543-0002
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF FUEL PRESENT IN CATCH BOTTLE, FUEL WILL LEAK PAST VALVE BUT
WILL BE STOPPED BY CAP ON DRAIN LINE. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR DUE TO
CAP ON LINE. WITHOUT CAP, IT WOULD ALLOW FUEL TO LEAK INTO AFT
COMPARTMENT-FIRE HAZARD.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-87
INDEPEND_ O_IT_ _SESSME_
O_IT_ SUBSYSTEM _YSIS WO_HEET
DA_: 9/17/86 HIG_ST _ITIC_ITY
SUBSYSTEM: _ F_GHT:
MDAC ID: 186 _RT:
HDWFUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE"
S_ _VI_ D_IN _T_ _T_ D_N V_VE
FAIT-q C_SED
_D _YST_ J. _S SUBSYS _: J. _ES
B_O_ HI__:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
_L SYSTEM
S_ _VITY D_IN _T_ BOTTT_
D_IN V_VE
_TI_IES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
__: 3/3
_FF: 3/3
ONO_IT: 3/3
DEO_IT: 3/3
_DING/S_ING: 3/3
_RT
RT_:
T_:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/_C
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
_D_D_ S_S: A [NA ] B [NA ]
_TION: _ COMP_TMEHT
P_T _BER: ME284-0543-0002
C [NA ]
MUSES: CO_INATION, CO_OSION _
_'T _ S_ _VI_ D_IN S_VICING; _SSIBT_ __ DE_Y.
_F_N_S :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/15/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 187
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LURE OIL PUMP
NO OUTPUT OR LOW OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) LURE OIL SYSTEM
3) LURE OIL PUMP
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: I/I
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT POWER, INTERNAL LEAKAGE, JAMMING OR
BINDING, INSUFFICIENT LURE OIL IN GEARBOX (SERVICING ERROR)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LUBRICATION TO APU GEARBOX; GEARBOX WILL OVERHEAT AND
WILL BE DAMAGED; APU WILL BE LOST. CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE TO
LOSS OF APU. ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 1/1 FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS
DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12110186 C-89
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 188
ITEM: GEARBOX GN2 BOTTLE
FAILURE MODE: LEAK ........
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) LUBE OIL SYSTEM
3) GEARBOX GN2 BOTTLE
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
F_GHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC -- ABORT HDW/  NC
RTLS: 2/IR
TAL: 2/IR
AOA: 2/IR
ATO: 2/1R
A[ i] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC oi O0ol .....
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, __G DAMAGE .......
LOSS OF GN2 TO REPRESSURIZE GEARBOX. IF GEARBOX LOSES GN2, APU
WILL BE LOST. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR: 2 F_AI_ S _AWAy._ .FROM .... _
CRITICALITY I.- ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS
DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE IF ONE APU IS LOST.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/17/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 189
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM: GEARBOX GN2 BOTTLE
FAILURE MODE_ RUPTURE AT OPERATING PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) LUBE OIL SYSTEM
3) GEARBOX GN2
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
91
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: HANDLING DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
I) LOSS OF GN2 TO PRESSURIZE GEARBOX. 2) POSSIBLE SHRAPNEL
DAMAGE TO APU'S AND OTHER AFT COMPARTMENT EQUIPMENT. POSSIBLE
FUEL LEAK AND FIRE HAZARD. CRITICALITY IS I/i DUE TO SHRAPNEL
DAMAGE.
w
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-91
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDACID: 190 ABORT:
ITEM: GEARBOXGN2 BOTTLE FILL COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) LUBE OIL SYSTEM
3) GN2 BOTTLE
4) FILL COUPLING
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 2/1R
TAL: 2/IR
AOA: 2/ IR
ATO: 2/ IR
A[ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME276--0032-0003 =:_ -_ _ - _ _
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATION .I :
LOSS OF GN2 TO REPRESSURIZE GEARBOX. IF GEARBOX LOSES GN2, APU
WILL BE LOST. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR_ 2 FAILURES AWAY _0_2 .....
CRITICALITY i. ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS
DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE IF ONE APU IS LOST.
REFERENCES :
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-92
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uDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
191 ABORT:
ITEM: GEARBOX GN2 BOTTLE FILL COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) LUBE OIL SYSTEM
3) GN2 BOTTLE
4) FILL COUPLING
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/3 TAL:
3/3 AOA:
3/3 ATO:
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME276-0032-0003
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT SERVICE GN2 BOTTLE-POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-93
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 192 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM: GEARBOX PRESSURIZATION VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
LUBE OIL SYSTEM
GEARBOX PRESSURIZATION VALVE
_ITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C = ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONGRBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] cCP]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC201-0001
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT SIGNAL, CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATiONALE:
LOSS OF GN2 TO REPRESSURIZE GEARBOX. IF GEARBOX LOSES GN2, APU
WILL BE LOST. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR BECAUSE SITUATION IS 2
FAILURES AWAY FROM CRIT i (G_X LEAK & APU LOSS)
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE
LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE IF ONE APU IS LOST.
REFERENCES: NO DESIGN DATA WAS OBTAINED FOR THIS VALVE.
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 193 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GEARBOX PRESSURIZATION VALVE
FAILS TO CLOSE (REMAINS OPEN)
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
_)
8)
9)
APU
LUBE OIL SYSTEM
GEARBOX PRESSURIZATION VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
3/IR TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
3/1R ATO: 2/1R
3/3
A[2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC201-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF VALVE OPENS, IT WILL STAY OPEN AND OVERPRESSURIZE GEARBOX. IF
GEARBOX LEAKS OUT ALL GN2, APU WILL BE LOST. CRITICALITY IS
3/IR: 2 FAILURES AWAY FROM CRITICALITY 1 (GEARBOX LEAK AND
ANOTHER APU LOST).
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/1R FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE
LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE IF ONE APU IS LOST.
REFERENCES: NO DESIGN DATA WAS OBTAINED FOR THIS VALVE.
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-95
INDEPENDE_ ORBITER _SESSME_
O_ITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_S_ET
DATE: 9/17/86 HIG_ST _ITI_LITY
SUBSYSTEM: _ F_G_:
MDAC ID: 194 ABORT:
ITEM: G_X P_SS_IZATION V_VE
FAIL_ MODE: I_E_
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/iR
_D _YST: J. _S stmsYs L_D: J. mm_s
B__ HIE__:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
APU
LUBE OIL SYSTEM
G_OX P_SS_IZATION V_VE
_ITI_ITIES
FLIG_ P_E _W/_C _RT HDW/_C
P__: 3/3 RT_: 2/IR
_OFF: 311R T_: 2/!R
oNO_IT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEb_IT: 3/IR ATO: 2/ IR
_DING/S_ING: 3/3
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
_CATION: _ COMP_TME_ • _-
P_T _B_: MC201-0001
_USES: CO_INATION, _FA_ING DEFEr, _DLING D_AGE
EFFE_S/_TION_:
GN2 BOTT 7._._ I_O G_X; A SU_EQ_ G_OX _, IF IT
DEP_ES _ G_OX, WI_ _USE _SS OF _ _. _ITI_LITY IS
3/IR BEMUSE SI_ATION IS 2 FAIL_S AWAY _OM _IT 1 (GE_OX
LEAK _D APU LOSS).
_ORT: _TI_I_ IS 2/IR FOR ENGI_-O_ _RTS DUE TO POSSIBT,_
_SS OF _O_R _IN ENGI_ IF O_ _ IS _ST.
_FE_NCES: NO DESIGN DATA W_ OBTAINED FOR _IS VALVE.
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_PORT DA_ 12/10/86 C-96
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/25/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 195
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/XR
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GEARBOX PRESSURIZATION VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) APU
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
s)
9)
LUBE OIL SYSTEM
GEARBOX PRESSURIZATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] SIP] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES:
ERROR
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE, INSTALLATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF GN2 FROM GEARBOX; IF LEAK DEPLETES GN2 BOTTLE,
APU WILL BE LOST. CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE TO LOSS OF ONE APU.
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS i/I FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE
LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE FOR APU LOSS.
REFERENCES: NO DESIGN DATA WAS OBTAINED FOR THIS VALVE.
E
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-97
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEMz APU FLIGHT:
MDACID: 196 ABORT:
ITEM: GEARBOXPRESSURIZATIONVALVE
FAILURE MODE: BARRIER LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
A_U
LUBE OIL SYSTEM
GEARBOX PRESSURIZATION VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
_TI_iTIEs
E_W/_ _ A_RT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 4 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION: _ COMPARTMENT
PART _BER: MC201-000i
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT
__ _ _-L_ --_ _ _:_ : _-_ _ _Z-_._ ...........
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT; VALVE COMPONENTS ARE COMPATIBLE WITH GN2.
REFERENCES: NO DESIGN DATA WAS OBTAINED FOR THIS VALVE.
HDW/_JNC
3/3
3/3
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-98
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/ 15/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 197
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LUBE OIL LINES
LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) LURE OIL SYSTEM
3) LURE OIL LINES
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] SIP] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: V070-465XXX
CAUSES:
ERROR
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE, INSTALLATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
i) LOSS OF LURE OIL. 2) LOSS OF APU DUE TO GEARBOX FAILURE.
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE TO LOSS OF ONE APU. ABORT: CRITICALITY
IS I/I FOR ENGINE-OUTS ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF ANOTHER
MAIN ENGINE.
REFERENCES :
r
m
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-99
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
198 ABORT:
LUBE OIL LINE FLEX HOSES
LEAK
HDW/nmc
2/IR
i/I
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) LUBE OIL SYSTEM
3) LUBE OIL LINES
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
_ITICALITIES
FLIG_ _E HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF- 2/ 1R TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
HDW/FUNC
1/i
i/i
I/i
i/i
A[ i] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
ME271-0079-410X
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE, HEATER BURN-
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
i) LOSS OF LUBE OIL. 2) LOSS OF APU DUE TO GEARBOX FAILURE.
CRITICALITY IS 2/iR DUE TO LOSS OF O_ _. ABORT: CRITICALITY
IS 1/1 FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN
ENGINE.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-100
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/15/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 199
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWlFUNC
2/1R
1/i
ITEM: GEARBOX FILL COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
_)
s)
9]
LUBE OIL SYSTEM
LUBE OIL LINES
GEARBOX FILL COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
F GHT  Wln C ABOHT HDWln C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/1R • AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0038-0500
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: INSTALLATION ERROR, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
I) LOSS OF LUBE OIL. 2) LOSS OF APU DUE TO GEARBOX FAILURE.
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE TO LOSS OF APU. ABORT: CRITICALITY IS
i/i FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE _OSS OF ANOTHER MAIN
ENGINE.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-101
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
200 ABORT:
ITEM: GEARBOXFILL COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYSLEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
APU
LUBE OIL SYSTEM
UmE OIL LINES
GEARBOX FILL COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI_OFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC621-0038-0500
CAUSES: CONT_INAT!ON, CORROSION, FILTER BLOCKED .
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT SERVICE G_OX-POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY.
REFERENCES •
HDW/_C
3/3
3/3
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 201 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GEARBOX HIGH POINT VENT COUPLING
EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHYz
APU
LUBE OIL SYSTEM
LUBE OIL LINES
GEARBOX HIGH POINT VENT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
s)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ i] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0038-0500
CAUSES: INSTALLATION ERROR, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
i) LOSS OF LUBE OIL. 2) LOSS OF APU DUE TO GEARBOX FAILURE.
CRITICALITY IS 2/1R DUE TO LOSS OF APU. ABORT: CRITICALITY IS
i/i FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN
ENGINE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-i03
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/16/86 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID" 202 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GEARBOX HIGH POINT VENT COUPLING
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
APU
LUBE OIL SYSTEM
LUBE OIL LINES
GEARBOX HIGH POINT VENT COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
• I2%NDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC621-0038-0500
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, FILTER BLOCKED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT PURGE GEARBOX-POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-i04 ..... " ....
i
U
g
mlB
ww
w
W
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 203 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GEARBOX CHIP DETECTOR
EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) LURE OIL SYSTEM
3) CHIP DETECTOR
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
HDW/FUNC
I/i
I/I
I/I
I/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] c[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: TBD
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, INSTALLATION ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
i) LOSS OF LURE OIL. 2) LOSS OF APU DUE TO GEARBOX FAILURE.
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE TO LOSS OF APU. ABORT: CRITICALITY IS
1/1 FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN
ENGINE.
REFERENCES :
u
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-105
INDEPENDENTORBITER _SESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 204 ABORT:
ITEM: GEARBOX LOW POINT DRAIN COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/l
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
APU
LUBE OIL SYSTEM
LUBE OIL LINES
GEARBOX LOW POINT DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC _ ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: I/i
DEORBIT: 2/ 1R ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0038-0500
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
i) LOSS OF LUBE OIL. 2) LOSS OF APU DUE TO GEARBOX FAILURE.
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE TO LOSS OF APU. ABORT: CRITICALITY IS
i/! FOR ENGINE,OUT-A_RTgD_ 15OSS_BLE _SS _OF__ _N
ENGINE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 205
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: GEARBOX LOW POINT DRAIN COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) LUBE OIL SYSTEM
3) LUBE OIL LINES
GEARBOX LOW POINT DRAIN COUPLING4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
/
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0038-0500
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT PERFORM LUBE OIL SERVICING; POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
m
m
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-I07
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 206 ABORT:
ITEM: GEARBOX HIGH POINT DRAIN COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/1
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
LUBE OIL SYSTEM
LUBE OIL LINES
GEARBOX HIGH POINT DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
i/1
i/I
1/1
c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC621-0038-0300
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
i) LOSS OF LUBE OIL. 2) LOSS OF APU DUE TO GEARBOX FAILURE.
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUETO__SS OF_' ABORT: CRITICALITY IS
I/i FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN
ENGINE.
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 207 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GEARBOX HIGH POINT DRAIN COUPLING
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
LUBE OIL SYSTEM
LUBE OIL LINES
GEARBOX HIGH POINT DRAIN COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC621-0038-0300
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT PERFORM LUBE OIL SERVICING; POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY.
REFERENCES:
HDWIFUNC
3/3
3/3
m
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-I09
IDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
208 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
i/I
ITEM: WSB DRAIN COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) LUBE OIL SYSTEM
3) LUBE OIL LINES
4) WSB DRAIN COUPLING
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 1/1
ONO_IT: 2/IR AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/ IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART _BER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLINGDAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
1) LOSS OF LUBE OIL. 2) LOSS OF APU DUE TO GEARBOX FAILURE.
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE TO LOSS OF APU. ABORT: CRITICALITY IS
1/1 FOR ENGINE OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN
ENGINE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 209
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WSB DRAIN COUPLING
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) LUBE OIL SYSTEM
3) LUBE OIL LINES
4) WSB DRAIN COUPLING
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT PERFORM LUBE OIL SERVICING; POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-111
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 210 ABORT:
ITEM: LUBE OIL LINE HEATER (18A, 18B, 19A, 19B)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OFF, OR LOW OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
HDW/nmC
3/IR
3/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
LUBE OIL SYSTEM
LUBE OIL LINE HEATER
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/1R
A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART_BER: MC_63-0027-000X
CAUSES: BROKEN WIRE, SHORT CIRCUIT, INSTALLATION ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LUBE OIL LINE HEATER REDUNDANCY. IF BOTH SETS OF HEATERS
ARE LOST, LUBE OIL CAN DROP BELOW 0 F; APU CANNOT BE STARTED
SAFELY FOR E_Y. CRITICALITY IS 3/1R, DUE TO HEATER AND APU
REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
211 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LUBE OIL LINE HEATER THERMOSTAT (SISA, SI8B)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
APU
LUBE OIL SYSTEM
LUBE OIL LINE HEATER
THERMOSTAT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
1)
2)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
ME360-0017-0007
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PORT STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FOR HEATING APU LUBE OIL LINES. IF ALL
HEATERS ARE LOST, LUBE OIL CAN DROP BELOW 0 F; APU CANNOT BE
STARTED SAFELY FOR ENTRY. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR, DUE TO HEATER AND
APU REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-113
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/04/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
212 ABORT:
LUBE OIL LINE HEATERTHERMOSTAT
FAIL CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
APU
LUBE OIL SYSTEM
LUBE OIL LINE HEATER
THERMOSTAT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDWi_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTM_
PART NUMBER: ME360-0017-0007
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION (SHORT) ...... .............
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_
ONE SET OF LUBE OIL HEATERS IS FAILED ON WHILE ACTIVE, BUT CAN BE
SWITCHED OFF.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 213
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LUBE OIL FILTER
PLUGGED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) LUBE OIL SYSTEM
3) LUBE OIL FILTER
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC201-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FUEL OR NH3 LEAK INTO LUBE OIL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LUBE OIL WILL BYPASS FILTER - LUBE OIL FLOW RATE WILL BE REDUCED;
AND GEARBOX WILL HEAT-UP FASTER, BUT APU WILL NOT BE AFFECTED
UNLESS CONTAMINATION PRESENT IN LUBE OIL DAMAGES GEARBOX (APU
COULD BE LOST).
CRITICALITY IS 3/IR:2 FAILURES AWAY FROM CRITICAL (CONTAMINATION
+ ANOTHER APU). ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS
SINCE LOSS OF ONE APU CAN BE CRITICAL.
REFERENCES:
w
w
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-IIS
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID-
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
214 ABORT:
HDW/nmc
3/1R
2/ZR
ITEM: LUBE OIL FILTER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN/NO FILTERING
LEAD ANALYST" J. _S S_SYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) LUBE OIL SYSTEM
3) LUBE OIL FILTER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
c [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC201-O001
CAusEs: _A_!_G _E_CT .......................
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT UNLESS CONTAMINATION IN LUBE OIL DAMAGES GEARBOX (APU
COULD BE LOST). CRITICALITY IS 3/_2 FAILURES AWAY FRO_ _
CRITICAL (CONTAMINATION + ANOTHER APU). ABORT: IS_
2/1R FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS SINCE LOSS OF ONE APU CAN BE CRITICAL.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
215 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LUBE OIL FILTER
EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) LUBE OIL SYSTEM
3) LUBE OIL FILTER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TALz 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: HANDLING DAMAGE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
i) LOSS OF LUBE OIL. 2) LOSS OF APU DUE TO GEARBOX FAILURE.
CRITICALITY IS 2/1R DUE TO LOSS OF APU. ABORT: CRITICALITY IS
1/1 FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN
ENGINE.
w
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REFERENCES:
u
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-i17
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
216 ABORT:
OIL FILTER BYPASS RELIEF VALVE
_AX_S CLOSED _ _
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
BREA_WN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
LUBE OIL SYSTEM
OIL FILTER BYPASS RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR _ ::
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFE_S/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, UNLESS FILTER IS PLUGGED. IF SO, LOSS OF LUBE OIL
CIRCULATION. APU WILL BE LOST. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR: 2 FAILURES
AWAY __6M-c_iL-_(PLU_Eb_FILTER + _/_OTHER APU LOST)-
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/1R FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS, SINCE LOSS OF
ONE APU CAN BE CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: NO DESIGN DATA WAS OBTAINED FOR THIS VALVE.
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-118 .
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
APU FLIGHT: 3/ 1R
217 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAKS
OIL FILTER BYPASS RELIEF VALVE
FAILS TO CLOSE (STUCK OPEN), OR FAILS OPEN, OR
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
LUBE OIL SYSTEM
OIL FILTER BYPASS RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/I_ TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
\
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
211R
211R
B[F] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE?
ALLOWS ANY CONTAMINATION PRESENT IN LUBE OIL TO ENTER GEARBOX.
APU CAN BE LOST IF GEARBOX IS DAMAGED. CRITICALITY IS 3/1R: 2
FAILURES AWAY FROM CRITICAL (CONTAMINATION + ANOTHER APULOST).
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/1R FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS,
SINCE LOSS OF ONE APU CAN BE CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: NO DESIGN DATA WAS OBTAINED FOR THIS VALVE.
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-I19
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/30/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 218
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GEARBOXBYPASSRELIEF VALVE
FAILS CLOSED(FAILS TO RELIEVE) .......
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I). APU
2) LUBE OIL SYSTEM
3) GEARBOX BYPASS RELIEF VALVE
4) ......
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES :
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3 ......::
A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ........'_'_..._:_ :: ........
NO EFFECT, EXCEPT POSSIBLE INCREASE IN LUBE OIL PRESSURE.
REFERENCES: NO DESIGN DATA WAS OBTAINED FOR THIS VALVE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
219 ABORT:
SDW/n C
2/1R
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GEARBOX BYPASS RELIEF VALVE
FAILS OPEN, OR FAILS TO CLOSE, OR LEAKS
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
LUBE OIL SYSTEM
GEARBOX BYPASS RELIEF VALVE
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: i/i
2/IR TAL: i/i
2/1R AOA: 1/1
2/IR ATO: i/I
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ALLOWS LUBE OIL TO BYPASS GEARBOX; GEARBOX CAN OVERHEAT DUE TO
INSUFFICIENT LUBRICATION - MAY HAVE TO SHUT DOWN APU.
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE TO LOSS OF APU.
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS I/i FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS, WHERE LOSS OF
ONE APU CAN BE CRITICAL.
REFERENCES: NO DESIGN DATA WAS OBTAINED FOR THIS VALVE.
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-121
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 220 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
1/1
ITEM: LUBE OIL ACCUMULATOR (ADD-ON)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK _-
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) LUBE OIL SYSTEM
3) ACCUMULATOR
4)
S)
6)
V)
e)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: i/1
ONOP_IT: 2/IR AOA: i/I
DE ORBIT: 2/IR ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
1) LOSS OF LUBE OIL. 2) LOSS OF APU DUE TO GEARBOK FAILURE.
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE _ L@_SS OF APU._; • _ _
ABORT: CRITIdALITY IS 1/1 ?OR _GI_-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE
LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-122
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/29/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 221
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
1/1
ITEM: LUBE OIL ACCUMULATOR (ADD-ON)
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) LUBE OIL SYSTEM
3) ACCUMULATOR
4)
5)
6)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: I/I
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
1) LOSS OF I/BE OIL SYSTEM PRESSURE, AND REDUCED LUBE OIL FLOW
RATE. 2) POSSIBLE LOSS OF APU DUE TO OVERHEATED GEARBOX.
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE TO LOSS OF APU. _ ABORT: CRITICALITY IS
1/1 FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN
ENGINE.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-123
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/30/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 222
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LURE OIL ACCUMULATOR (INTEGRAL)
EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/1
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) LURE OIL SYSTEM
3) ACCUMULATOR
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 1/1
OI_DRBIT: ' 2/IR _ AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER:...... MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT ................
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
i) LOSS OF LURE OIL. 2) LOSS OF APU DUE TO GEARBOX FAILURE.
CRITICALITY IS 2/_ DUE TO LOSS OF APU. .... :_- _ _ _ _,,
_ORT: CRITiCALI_IS i/i_FOR ENGINE-O_ABO__ TO _POSSIBLE
LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE.
REFERENCES :
U
m
mm
g
mm
m
e
.=_
m
m
om
m
l
B
l
mm
u
u
U
I
n
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-124
z
i
=imi
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/30/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 223
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LUBE OIL ACCUMULATOR(INTEGRAL)
I_E_ALLEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) LUBE OIL SYSTEM
3) ACCUMULATOR
4)
s)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE •
1) LOSS OF LUBE OIL PRESSURE, AND REDUCED LUBE OIL FLOW RATE. 2)
POSSIBLE LOSS OF APU DUE TO OVERHEATED GEARBOX. CRITICALITY IS
2/1R DUE TO LOSS OF APU.
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 1/1 FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE
LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE.
REFERENCES :
i
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-125
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 224
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
i/1
i/1
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING VALVE
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM
3) VALVE
4)
5)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ON ORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 1/1
LANDING/SATING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 1/1
A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
ME284-20552-000X
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, INSTALLATION ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIoNs:
LOSS OF INJECTOR COOLING WATER. CRITICALITY IS i/I FOR DEORBIT
BEFO_ APU COOLDOWN. _ STARTED HOT MAY CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
225 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INJECTOR COOLING VALVE
INTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM
3) VALVE
4)
s)
6)
e)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
i/I ATO: i/I
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
ME284-0552-000X
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEPLETION OF INJECTOR COOLING WATER. CRITICALITY IS I/i FOR
EMERGENCY DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT MAY CAUSE
FUEL TO DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-127
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC IDz 226
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INJECTOR COOLING VALVE
FAIL TO OPEN, FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM
3) VALVE
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
O_R]BIT: ....
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES _
HDW/FUNC _- ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
2/1R ATO: 2/1R
3/3
A[ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME284-0552-000X
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, BROKEN WIRE, SHORTED COIL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF INJECTOR COOLING FOR ONE APU. CRITICALITY 2/1R FOR
DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT COULD CAUSE FUEL TO
DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
227 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INJECTOR COOLING VALVE
FAIL TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM
3) VALVE
4)
5)
_)
_)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME284-0552-000X
s [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEPLETION OF INJECTOR COOLING WATER; NO MORE IS LIKELY TO BE
NEEDED IN THIS CASE, SO LOSS OF WATER IS INCONSEQUENTIAL.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-129
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID; 228 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INJECTOR COOLINGVALVE
BARRIER FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYSLEAD: J. BARNES
i
in
i
i
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) APU m
2) INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM
3) VALVE
4) m
5)
6)
7)
s) []
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF; 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT; 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME284-0552-000X
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTING OF COIL; LOSS OF VALVE OPEN CAPABILITY. LOSS OF
INJECTOR C0OLING TO ONE APU. CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR DEORBIT
BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT COULD CAUSE FUEL TO
DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 229 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
i/1
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING WATER TANK
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK (WATER OR N2)
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
8)
9)
APU
INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM
WATER TANK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
•LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME282-0100-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
•LOSS OF INJECTOR COOLING CAPABILITY FOR HOT RESTART OF APU.
CRITICALITY IS I/I FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED
HOT COULD CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
--=
w
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-131
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET_
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 230 ABORT:
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING WATER TANK
FAILURE MODE: DIAPHRAGM _r _ ........ --
LEAD ANALYST: J" BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM
3) WATER TANK
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICAL!. TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB_T" 3/_ AOA: 3/_
DEO_.BIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 .............
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PARTNT/_BER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
ME282"_i00-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE
EFFECTS/_RATIONALE:
MORE RAPID DEPLETION OF WATER PRESSURE DURING USE, BUT COOLING
SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT. _ _ :_
REFACES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 231 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING GN2 FILL COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM
GN2 FILL COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TA.L: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B CNA 3 C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME276-0032-0009
CAUSES:
DAMAGE
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, INSTALLATION ERROR, HANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TANK PRESSURE: LOSS OF INJECTOR COOLING CAPABILITY FOR
HOT RESTART OF APU. CRITICALITY IS 1/1 FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU
COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT COULD CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-133
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 232 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INJECTOR COOLING GN2 FILL COUPLING
FAIL CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM
GN2 FILL COUPLING
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
_DW/rLmC _aOHT
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART_BER: ME276-0032-0009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EF_/PAT_ONALE:
CANNOT SERVICE INJECTOR COOLING _YSTEM; POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY.
REFERENCES:
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ii/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
233 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM"
FAILURE MODE:
INJECTOR COOLING WATER LINES (MANIFOLD)
EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
APU
INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM
WATER LINES (MANIFOLD)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
VO70-465521
CAUSES: INSTALLATION ERROR, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF INJECTOR COOLING WATER AND/OR FREEZE-UP OF LINE: LOSS OF
COOLING FOR APU HOT RESTART. CRITICALITY I/I FOR DEORBIT BEFORE
APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT MAY CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
W
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-135
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBIT_SUBSySTEMANALYSISWO_HEET
11/03/86 HIGHEST _ITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
234 _RT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INJE_OR COOLING WA_ LI_S (MANIFO_)
BLOCKAGE
ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS _: J. _S
B_WN HIERAR_:
m) APU
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM
WATER LINES (MANIFOLD)
FLIGHT PHAS_
P_LAUN_:
_OFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
_DING/S_ING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART _BER: V070-4_2 i
_ITICALITIES
HDW/_c _ ...... ABORT HDW/_C
3/3 RT_: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
i/i ATO: i/i
3/3
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION _ ....:= _ ....
EFFECTS/RATION_ :
LOSS OF INJECTOR COOLING CAPABILITY FOR ONE A_, OR ALL 3 APU'S.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 235 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING WATER FILL COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
APU
INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM
WATER LINES (MANIFOLD)
FILL COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0038,0100
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF INJECTOR COOLING WATER; LOSS OF COOLING FOR APU HOT
RESTART. CRITICALITY IS 1/1 FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN.
APU STARTED HOT COULD CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-137
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 236 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLINGWATERFILL COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYSLEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM
WATER LINES (MANIFOLD)
FILL COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART_BER: MC621-0038-0100
C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT SERVICE INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM; POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY.
REFERENCES:
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
237 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IN_CTOR COOLING WATER LI_-APUX
E_E_ALLEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
s)
9)
APU
INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM
WATER LINE-APU X
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[F]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: V070-465521
CAUSES: INSTALLATION ERROR, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF INJECTOR COOLING AND/OR FREEZE-UP OF LINE I LOSS OF
COOLING FOR HOT RESTART OF ONE APU. CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR
DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT COULD CAUSE FUEL TO
DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-139
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
238 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/LR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INJECTOR COOLING WATER LINE-APU X
BLOCKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM
WATER LINE-APU X
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
"LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[F]
LO_TION;
PART _BER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
V070-46SS21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF INJECTOR COOLING CAPABILITY FOR ONE APU. CRITICALITY IS
2/IR FOR DEORBIT_BEFORE APU C__WN. APU STARTED_ HOT COULD ....
CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE, ................ :_
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INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1I/03/86 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 239 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING WATER LINE FLEX HOSE
FAILURE MODE: LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM
WATER LINE - APU X
FLEX HOSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFZNG: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[F]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME271-0079-6401
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE, INSTALLATION
ERROR, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF INJECTOR COOLING, FOR ONE APU. CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR
DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT COULD CAUSE FUEL TO
DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-141
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
240 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INJECTOR COOLINGWATERTANK HEATER
FAIL-OFF, OR LOWOUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
3)
6)
s)
9)
APU
INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM
WATER TANK HEATER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC363-0025-0002
CAUSES: BROKEN WIRE, THERMOSTAT FAIL OPEN, SHORT CIRCUIT,
INSTALLATION ERROR _ i
EFFECTS/RATIONALZ:
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FOR HEATING INJECTOR COOLINGWATER TANK. IF
WILL BE _ST. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU
coou_w.. _ STARTED HOT COULD CAUSE raEL TO DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
241 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INJECTOR COOLING WATER TANK HEATER THERMOSTAT
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
APU
INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM
WATER TANK HEATER
THERMOSTAT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC452-0147-XXXX
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HEATER FOR INJECTOR COOLING WATER TANK. IF
BOTH HEATERS ARE LOST, WATER CAN FREEZE AND INJECTOR COOLING WILL
BE LOST. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN.
APU STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
w
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INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
242 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INJECTOR COOLING WATER TANKHEATERTHERMOSTAT
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
APU
INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM
WATER TANK HEATER
THERMOSTAT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART _BER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC452-0147-_
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
AFFECTED HEATER SET (A OR B) IS FAILED ON WHEN ACTIVE, BUT CAN BE
SWIT_D OFF. _ _ _ _ __
REFERENCES:
I
U
i
D
m
I
U
i
z
m
mm
g
I
D
i
l
I
m
mm
u
m
mm
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-144
m
ww
w
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
243 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INJECTOR COOLING WATER LINE HEATER
FAILS OFF, OR LOW OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM
WATER LINE HEATER
FLIGHT PHASE
PRBLAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[NA] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC363-0026-XXXX
CAUSES: BROKEN WIRE, .THERMOSTAT FAIL OPEN, SHORT CIRCUIT,
INSTALLATION ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FOR HEATING INJECTOR COOLING WATER LINES. IF
BOTH HEATERS ARE LOST, WATER LINES WILL FREEZE, AND INJECTOR
COOLING WILL BE LOST. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU
COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT COULD CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-145
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
244 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INJECTOR COOLING WATER LINE HEATER THERMOSTAT
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM
3) WATER LINE HEATER
4) THERMOSTAT
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT _E HDW/_ .... _RT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/IR
B [NA ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC452-0147-XXXX
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT HEATER FOR INJECTOR COOLING WATER LINES. IF
BOTH HEATERS ARE LOST, LINES CAN FREEZE AND INJECTOR COOLING WILL
BE LO-ST_-_"FICKLITY IS_ _0R DEORBITBEFOREAPU COOLDOWN.
APU STARTED HOT COULD CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
245 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INJECTOR COOLING WATER LINE HEATER THERMOSTAT
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
_)
4)
5)
6)
_)
8)
9)
APU
INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM
WATER LINE HEATER
THERMOSTAT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC452-0147-XXXX
CAUSES: SHORT, WELDED CONTACTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFECTED HEATER SET (A OR B) IS FAILED ON WHEN ACTIVE, BUT CAN BE
SWITCHED OFF.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-147
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
246 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING RELIEF VALVE
FAIL CLOSED; RELIEVE OVER SPEC
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
APU
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH_ 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONe.IT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC284-0431-0001
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 2/ 1R
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION , CORROSIO N _
EFFE_S/RATIONALE:
THERMAL EXPANSION IN WATER LINE BETWEEN TANK VALVES COULD RUPTURE
WATER LINE OR START A _. RESULT COULD BE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY _
FO__ _P/_VMC_I_. CRITICALI"I_ _S 2/iR FOR DEORBi"r
BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
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ss
B _
INDEPENDE_ O_ITER _SESSME_
O_ITER SUBSYSTEM _YSIS WO_ET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIG_ST _ITI_ITY
SUBSYSTEM: _ F_G_:
MDAC ID: 247 _ORT:
ITEM: _L _P/_VM C_T.TNG _LIEF V_VE
FAIL_ MODE: FAI_ TO C_SE (S_CK OPEN) ; I__
_D _YST: J. _S SUBSYS _: J. _S
B__ HI__:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
_L _P/_VM COOLING SYSTEM
_EF V_VE
_ITI_LITIES
F_G_ P_E _W/_C _RT HDW/_C
P__: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LI_OFF: 3/3 T_: 3/3
ONO_IT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEO_IT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_D_D_CY S_S: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
_CATION: _COMP_TME_
P_T_BER: MC284-0431-0001
_USES: CO_INATION
EFFE_S/_TION_:
NO EFFE_; _ING V_VE _S_ C_SES OFF WA_R F_W.
_FE_N_S :
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
m
1
_RT DA_ 12110186 C-149
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET _
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11103186
248
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/IR
ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING RELIEF VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES suBsYs LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
s)
s)
APU
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
RELIEF VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/I_C ..... ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: _AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC284-0431-0001
SiP] C[P]
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, INSTALLATION ERROR .........
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF COOLING WATER; LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FOR FUEL PUMP/GGVM
COOLING. CRXTICALITY IS 2/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN.
APU STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: II/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 249 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING GN2 LINE
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
GN2 LINE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] siP] c[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, INSTALLATION ERROR, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE FROM REDUNDANT COOLING SYSTEM. OTHER SYSTEM IS
UNAFFECTED. IF BOTH SYSTEMS WERE LOST, NO APU POST-RUN COOLDOWN.
APU COULD DETONATE IF STARTED WHILE HOT FOR EMERGENCY DEORBIT.
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-151
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 250 ABORT:
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVMCOOLINGVALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAIL TO OPEN; FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
APU
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING VALVE
FLIGNT _SE
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING" 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CR!TICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/IR
A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART _BER:
COMPARTMENT
ME284-0052-000X
CAUSES--CO_OSION, CONTAMINATION, SHORTED OR OPEN COIL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING FOR ONE APU.
CRITICALITY IS 3/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN.
HDWIFUNC
3/1R
3/1R
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
251 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/iS
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING VALVE
FAIL OPEN (FAIL TO CLOSE), INTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
APU
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
ME284-0552-000X
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT UNTIL SYSTEM IS ACTIVATED; THEN, DEPLETION OF ONE
SYSTEMtS WATER UNTIL THAT SYSTEM IS DEACTIVATED. CRITICALITY IS
2/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE
FUEL TO DETONATE.
m
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: Ii/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 252 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
311R
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING VALVE
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL BARRIER FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BRY.,AKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A C 2 ] B [NA ] C C P ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME284-0552-000X
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT CIRCUIT OF SOLENOID COIL-VALVE WILL BE FAILED CLOSED.
CRITICALITY IS 3/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. VALVE
FAILED CLOSED MEANS NO COOLING FOR AFFECTED APU. APU STARTED HOT
CAN CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 253 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEMs FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING VALVE
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
APU
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
311R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME284-0552-000X
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, INSTALLATION ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT UNTIL SYSTEM IS ACTIVATED; THEN, DEPLETION OF ONE
SYSTEM'S WATER, AND NO COOLING TO ONE APU (UNTIL SWITCHOVER TO
REDUNDANT SYSTEM). CRITICALITY IS 3/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU
COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-155
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
254 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER TANK
EXTERNAL LEAK (WATER OR N2)
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HI__:
i) APU
2) FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
3) WATER TANK
4)
s)
4)
7)
8)
9)
CRIT!_ITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELA.UNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI_OFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3_
0NORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUND_'_CYSCREENS" A C i B[_] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC282-0094-000i
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE ......
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FOR POST-RUN APU COOLDOWN. CRITICALITY IS
2/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU _TED HOT CAN CAUSE
FUEL TO DETONATE.
Q
REFE_CES:
l
I
m
I
m
B
g
!
I
IE
l
m
l
E
m
!
g
i
w
I
m
m
im
m
i
I
i
i
g
J
I
REPORT DATE 12/10/84 C-156
I
R
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 255 ABORT:
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER TANK
FAILURE MODE: DIAPHRAGM LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
APU
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
WATER TANK
CRITICAI_TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC282-0094-0001
CAUSES:
ERROR
MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE, INSTALLATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO _F_ECT U_IL SYS_M ACTIVATED; THEN, MAY SEE FASTER DEPLETION
OF SYSTEM PRESSURE AS N2 IS EXPELLED. WORST CASE IS LOSS OF
REDUNDANT SYSTEM. CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU
COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
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OINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM-" APU FLIGHT: 2/ IR
MDAC ID: 256 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER LINES-BETWEEN TANK
AND TANK VALVES
FAILURE MODE: LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
3) WATER LINES
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRBLAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
a/IR
REDUNDANCYSCREENS: At _
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: V070-465521
B[P] c[p]
CAUSES: - MANUFACTURING DEFECT, INSTALLATION ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSSOF _00__NGWATE_RYR_0MONESYSTEM. _TICALITY IS 2/IR FOR
DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT_-CAUSE _L TO
DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 257
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/1R
ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER LINES-BETWEEN TANK
AND TANK VALVES
FAILURE MODE: BLOCKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
WATER LINES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] s[P] c[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: V070-465521
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDNUNDANCY FOR POST-RUN APU COOLDOWN. CRITICALITY IS
2/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE
FUEL TO DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-159
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM" APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 258 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER FILL COUPLING
FAILURE MODE: LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
APU
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
WATER LINES
FILL COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH= 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC621-0038-0100
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, INSTALLATION ERROR, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF COOLING WATER FOR ONE SYSTEM. CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR
DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO
DETONATE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
259 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER FILLCOUPLING
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
e)
9)
I) APU
2) FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
3) WATER LINES
FILL COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC621-0038-0100
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C CNA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT SERVICE ONE FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM.
LAUNCH DELAY.
POSSIBLE
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
APU FLIGHT: 2/IR
260 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
VALVE ANDAPU
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP/GGVMCOOLINGWATERLINES-BETWEENTANK
LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
APU
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
WATER LINES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: V070-465521
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, INSTALLATION ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT UNTIL_'YSTEM IS ACTIVATED; THEN, LOSS OF COOLING WATER
FOR ONE SYSTEM. CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU
COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
APU FLIGHT: 3/1R
261 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
VALVE AND APU
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER LINES-BETWEEN TANK
BLOCKAGE AT FILTER
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
APU
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
WATER LINES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: V070-465521
B[P] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATiONALE:
LOSS OF COOLING REDUNDANCY TO ONE APU. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR FOR
DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO
DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
262 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER LINE FLEX HOSE
LEAK
SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
APU
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
WATER LINES
_LEx Hose
1)
2)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
g)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/1R
C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
M_2Vl-0079-64XX
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT UNTIL SYSTEM IS ACTIVATED; THEN, LOSS OF COOLING WATER
TO ONE APU. CRITICALITY IS 3/IRFOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN.
APU STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE_TO_TONATE. _..........
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 263 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM: SPRAY ORIFICE
FAILURE MODE: BLOCKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
WATER LINES
SPRAY NOZZLES
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POST-RUN COOLING TO ONE APU. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR FOR
DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO
DETONATE.
i REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-165
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
264 ABORT:
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER TANK VALVE
FAIL TO OPEN; FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
S)
9)
APU
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
WATER TANK VALVE
CRITICA/._TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
ME284-O552-000X
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, SHORTED OR OPEN SOLENOID COIL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FOR APU POST-RUN COOLING. CRITICALITY IS 2/1R
FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL
T_ _ DETONATEL/ i..... _ _ ............. _ .............
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-166
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 265 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
311R
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER TANKVALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAIL TO CLOSE (STUCK OPEN), INTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
AP_
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
WATER TANK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME284-0552-000X
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT: PULSING VALVES PROVIDE REDUNDANT SHUTOFF.
CRITICALITY IS 3/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN (MUST LOSE
ONE MORE VALVE AND REDUNDANT COOLING SYSTEM AND BE FORCED TO
DEORBIT WHILE APU'S ARE HOT TO BE AT CRITICALITY I).
APU STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-167
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 266 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER TANK VALVE
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL BARRIER LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
3) WATER TANK VALVE
4)
5)
6)
.)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
01_GRB.IT: _ 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
pART HI_MBER: :ME284-OSS2-OOOX ....................
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT ............ ..........
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WATER IN SOLENOID CAVITY WILL SHORT OUT SOLENOID COIL; VALVE WILL
BE FAILED IN CLOSED POSITION. LOSS OF COOLINGSyS_E_oI_D_DANCY.
CRITI_C_ IS 2/1R FOR DEORBIT___C0_LDOWN.
APU STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-168
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBS YSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 267 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER TANK VALVE
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
?)
8)
9)
APU
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
WATER TANK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/nmc
3/3
3/3
3/3
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME284-0552-000X
B[P] c[p]
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, INSTALLATION ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF COOLING WATER FROM ONE OF TWO COOLING SYSTEMS.
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED
HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-169
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBS YSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 268 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER TANK HEATER
FAIL OFF, OR LOW OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
S/IR
S/1R
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
S)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
WATER TANK HEATER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUMe ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: S/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT" 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC363-0025-0003
CAUSES: SHORT CIRCUIT, BROKEN WIRE, INSTALLATION ERROR
LOSS OF HEATER REDUNDANCY FOR ONE SYSTEM WATER TANK. IF THE
OTHER HEATER SET IS LOST, THE WATER TANK CAN FREEZE, CAUSING LOSS
OF FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING REDUNDANCY. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR FOR
DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN.
APU STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-170
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 269 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/1R
ITEM:
THERMOSTAT
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER TANKHEATER
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
APU
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
WATER TANK HEATER
THERMOSTAT
/
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
ME360-0017-0006
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HEATER REDUNDANCY FOR ONE OF TWO WATER TANKS. IF BOTH
HEATERS LOST, WATER COULD FREEZE, AND COOLING sYSTEM REDUNDANCY
WOULD BE LOST. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU
COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12110/86 C-171
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
270 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
THERMOSTAT
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP/GGVMCOOLINGWATERTANKHEATER
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWNHI_CHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
APU
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
WATER TANKHEATER
THERMOSTAT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME360-0017-0006
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION _:_ _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AFFE_D HEATER SET IS FAILED ON WHEN ACTIVE, BUT CAN BE SWITCHED
OFF. REDUNDANT HEATER SET IS UNAFFECTED_
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REFERENCES: l
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-172
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 271 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER LINEHEATER
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OFF, OR LOW OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAXDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
S)
9)
APU
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
WATER LINE HEATER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 . AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC363-0026-XXXX
CAUSES: SHORT CIRCUIT, BROKEN WIRE, INSTALLATION ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HEATER REDUNDANCY FOR A PORTION OF THE WATER LINES FOR
ONE OF THE TWO COOLING SYSTEM. IF OTHER HEATER WERE LOST, THE
AFFECTED PROTION OF THE LINE WOULD FREEZE, CAUSING LOSS OF
COOLING SYSTEM REDUNDANCY TO ONE APU, OR ALL THREE APUS.
CRITICALITY IS 3/1R FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED
HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
REFERENCES :
w
= :
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-173
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
272 ABORT:
ITEM:
THERMOSTAT
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP/_VM COOLING WATER LINE HEATER
FAIL OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST" J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
APU
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
WATER LINE HEATER
THERMOSTAT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC452-0147-XXXX
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HEATER REDUNDANCY FOR A PROTION OF THE WATER LINE FOR ONE
OF THE TWO COOLING SYSTEMS. IF OTHER HEATER WERE LOST, THE
AFFECTED PORTION OF THE LINE WOULD FREEZE, COUSING LOSS OF
COOLING SYSTEM REDUNDANCY TO ONE APU, OR ALL THREE APUS.
CRITICALITY IS 3/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED
HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
u
U
n
mm
D
m
D
mm
mum
m
ms
B
!
u
r
m
mm
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-174
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER _SSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/09/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
273 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
THERMOSTAT
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER LINEHEATER
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
APU
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
WATER LINE HEATER
THERMOSTAT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC452-0147-XXXX
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
AFFECTED HEATER SET IS FAILED ON WHEN ACTIVE, BUT CAN BE SWITCHED
OFF. REDUNDANT HEATER SET IS UNAFFECTED.
REFERENCES:
i
i
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-175
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID" 274 ABORT:
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVMCOOLINGCHECKVALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAIL TO OPEN (FAIL CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
3) CHECK VALVE
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PI_LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
I_ANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/IR
c[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFE_S/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING TO ONE APU. CRITICALITY IS 3/1R
FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL
TO DETONATE. _
z
I
z
m
m
mm
mm
mm
[]
l
i
m
J
I
mm
u
m
m
REFE_NCES: i
I
m
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-176
m
g
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I0/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 275 ABORT:
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CHECK VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAIL TO CLOSE (STUCK OPEN)
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
APU
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM
CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER:
HDW/nmc
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-177
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/03/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 276
ITEM: EXHAUST PLENUM HOUSING
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) APU
2) STRUCTURE
3) EXHAUST PLENUM HOUSING
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: i/1 RTLS: i/_1
LIFTOFF: i/i TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: " 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: I/1 ___
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
PART NUMBER: MC201-00001 " _ .......
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, HANDLING DAMAGE, FATIGUE,
CONTAMINATION OF SEALING SURFACES
EFFECTS/RATIQNALE" ....
ALLOWS HOT GASES INTO AFT COMPARTME_.
EQUIPMENT IN COM-PARTME_, FIRE _ZARD.
FIRE HAZARD.
POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO O_R
CRIT_TY IS 1/1 DUE TO
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
277 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXHAUST PLENUM HOUSING
CRACKING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
STRUCTURE
EXHAUST PLENUM HOUSING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-00001
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: THERMAL FATIGUE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HOUSING COULD COME INTO CONTACTWITH TURBINE WHEEL, CAUSING LOSS
OF APU. CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE TO LOSS OF APU. ABORT:
CRITICALITY IS i/I FOR ENGINE OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF
ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-179
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 278 ABORT: i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
E_AUST PLENUM HOUSING
INTE_ALLEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
_z
i
I
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U
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU ..
2) STRUCTURE
3) EXHAUST PLENUM HOUSING
4)
5) r.
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC m
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [P]
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC201-00001
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT IN SEALS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ALLOWS TURBINE GASES TO ENTER GEARBOX; MIXING WITH LUBE OIL
PRODUCES WAX WHICH COULD PREVENT PROPER LUBRICATION OF GEARBOX;
APU COULD BE LOST. CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR APU LOSS. ABORT:
CRITICALITY IS i/i FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS, DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS
OF ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE.
REFERENCES :
U
u
m
U
_I
m
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-180
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/02/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
279 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
I/i
ITEM: GEARBOX HOUSING
FAILURE MODE: LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) STRUCTURE
3) GEARBOX HOUSING
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LUBE OIL FROM GEARBOX; APU WIlL BE LOST IF LEAKAGE IS
GREAT ENOUGH. CRITICALITY IS 2/1R DUE TO LOSS OF APU. ABORT:
CRITICALITY IS I/i FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF
ANOTHER MAIN ENGINE.
REFERENCES :
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-181
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
280 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
"APU CONTROL" SWITCH
FAIL TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
APU CONTROL CIRCUIT
"APU CONTROL" SWITCH
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: /NA
TAL: /NA
AOA: /NA
ATO: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: PANEL R2
PART NUMBER:
A[I] B[P] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST-CASE EFFECT IS LOSS OF APU START/RUN CAPABILITY.
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE TO REDUNDANCY OF APU'S.
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
281 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
"APU CONTROL" SWITCH
FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
APU CONTROL CIRCUIT
"APU CONTROL" SWITCH
SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
CRITI_TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL R2
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
•EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF APU. CRITICALITY _IS 2/IR DUE TO APU REDUNDANCY. ABORT:
CRITICALITY IS 1/1 FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS, WHERE LOSS OF ONE APU
_CAN BE CRITICAL. ...........
REFERENCES:
t
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-183
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/14/86
SUBS YSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 282
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
"APU CONTROL" SWITCH
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/1R
ABORT: 2/ IR
FAIL TO OPEN (STUCK IN "START/RUN")
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
APU CONTROL CIRCUIT
"APU CONTROl' SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 573
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL R2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION (SHORT
E  ECTS/ TiON _LE."
APU CANNOT BE SHUT DOWN IN NORMAL MANNER; MUST BE SHUT DOWN BY
CLOSING FUEL TANK VALVES. NO HOT RESTART CAPABILITY.
CRITICALITY_I'S 2/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDO_. APU STARTED
HOT MAY CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-184
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
283 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
"APU CONTROL" SWITCH
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
APU CONTROL CIRCUIT
"APU CONTROL" SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL R2
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION (SHORT)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT - APUFUEL TANK VALVES WILL PREVENT FUEL FROM REACHING
GAS GENERATOR.
REFERENCES :
m
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-185
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID-" 284 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: APU CONTROLCIRCUIT GROUNDCONTROLINPUT DRIVER
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OFF, FAIL TO REMAIN ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
41
s)
6)
7)
s)
97
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
APU CONTROL CIRCUIT
GROUND CONTROL INPUT DRIVER
CRITi_LITI_S
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH • 3/3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAYING: 3/_
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT LCA 1,2,3
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT, VIBRATION
EFrECTS/__:
LOSS OF PRELAUNCH GROUND CONTROL OF APU START. NO EFFECT ON
FLIGHT_ THIS COMMAND IS NOT NEEDED FOR NORMAL PRELAUNC"d
ACT_TIES.
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-186
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INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 285 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: APU CONTROL CIRCUIT GROUND CONTROL INPUT DRIVER
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
s)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
APU CONTROL CIRCUIT
GROUND CONTROL INPUT DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA 1,2,3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRELAUNCH, SENDS START COMMAND TO APU. APU WILL NOT START,
BECAUSE FUEL TANK VALVES ARE CLOSED. COMMAND IS NULLIFIED AT
LIFTOFF. APU WILL START WHEN FULE TANK VALVES ARE OPENED BEFORE
LIFTOFF.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-187
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
286 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
APU CONTROL CIRCUIT SWITCH POWER FUSE
FAIL OPEN _ .... _
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
3) APU CONTROL CIRCUIT
4) SWITCH POWER FUSE
5)
S)
7)
8)
9)
FLIG_ PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF"
ONORBIT-
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
 EDUND CY SCreENS:
LOCATION: PANEL R2
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
3/IR TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 2/1R
3/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
A[2] B[F] C[P]
CAUSES: CORROSION, INSTALLATION ERROR, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FOR APU START AND START/OVERRIDE COMMANDS. IF
BOTH FUSES ARE LOST, APU WON'T OPERATE. CRITICALITY IS 3/1R DUE
TO START COMMAND REDUNDANCY AND ]_U REDUNDAi_CY. _ :
ABORT: CRITI_ITY IS 2/IR FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS, WHERE LOSS OF
ONE APU CAN BE CRITICAL.
REFERENCES:
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I0/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 287 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: APU CONTROL CIRCUIT START CONTROL INPUT DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
APU CONTROL CIRCUIT
START CONTROL INPUT DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA 1,2,3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FOR APUSTART COMMAND, START/OVERRIDE IS
UNAFFECTED. IF APU START FUNCTION IS LOST, APU WILL NOT START,
OR WILL SHUT DOWN. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR DUE TO START COMMAND
REDUNDANCY AND APU REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-189
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
I0/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
288 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
"APU CNTLR PWR" SWITCH
FAIL TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
_)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT
"APU CNTLR PWR" SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL R2
ME452-0102-7252
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PAR T STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFE_S/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO APU CONTROLLER, LOSS OF APU. CRITICALITY IS
2/1R DUE TOAPU REDUNDANCY.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
289 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
"APU CNTLR PWR" SWITCH
FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J, B_S
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT
"APU CNTLR PWR" SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 1/1
ONORB IT: 2/ 1R AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL R2
ME452-0102-7252
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF APU. CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE TO APU REDUNDANCY. ABORT:
CRITICALITY IS i/i FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS, WHERE LOSS OF ONE APU
CAN BE CRITICAL.
REFERENCES:
W
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-191
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/14/86
SUBSYSTEM" ....__A_
MDAC ID: ,,390
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: "APU CNTLR PWR" SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAIL TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
_)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT
"APU CNTLR PWR" SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL R2
ME452-0102-7252
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION (SHORT)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
APU CONTROLLER CANNOT BE POWERED OFF. NO ADVERSE AFFECTS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
291 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
"APU CNTLR PWR" SWITCH
INADVERTENT OPERATION
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT
"APU CNTLR PWR" SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: PANEL R2
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7252
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION (SHORT)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
APU CONTROLLER IS POnD UP INADVERTENTLY. NO ADVERSE EFFECTS.
REFERENCES:
w
w
L__ REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-lg3
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDACID: 292 ABORT"
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/1R
ITEM: CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT RPC
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN (NO OUTPUT)
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
APU
_.'LECTRICAL SYSTEM
-CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ i] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4,5,6
MC450-0017-I075
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF APU CONTROLLER REDUNDANT POWER SUPPLY. CRITICALITY IS
3/IRDUE TO PO_SUPPLY AND APU REDUNDANCY. ABORT: CRITICALITY
IS 2/IR FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS, WHERE LOSS OF ONE APU CAN BE
CRITICAL.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/14/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 293
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT RPC
FAILURE MODE: FAIL CLOSED ......
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT
REMOT POWER CONTROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4,5,6
MC450-0017-1075
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION (SHORT), MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
APU CONTROLLER IS ADVERTENTLY POWERED UP. NO ADVERSE EFFECTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-195
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
lO/14/86
APU
294
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/F_'NC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT POWER INPUT DIODE
FAIL OPEN, OR SHORT CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT
POWER INPUT DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 . AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4,5,6
PART NUMBER: _XINII88R
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE •
LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO APU CONTROLLER. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR
DUE TO POWER SUPPLY AND APU REDUNDANCY. ABORT: CRITI_ITY IS
2/1R FOR EN&'IqTE-_)_JTABORTS, WEERE LOSS OF ONE APU CAN BE _
CRITICAL.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-196
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
295 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/1R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER POWER SWITCH POWER FUSE
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT
SWITCH POWER FUSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDWlFU C
211R
211R
2/1R
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] c[p]
LOCATION: PANEL R2
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, INSTALLATION ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO APU CONTROLLER. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR
DUE TO POWER SUPPLY AND APUREDUNDANCY. ABORT: CRITICALITY IS
2/IR FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS, WHERE LOSS OF ONE APU CAN BE
CRITICAL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-197
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
296 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT CONTROL INPUT DIODE
FAIL OPEN, OR SHORT CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
CONTROLLER POWER INPUT
CONTROL DIODE
..... CRITIC-_ITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4,5,6
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CONTROLLER POWER SUPPLY A. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR DUE TO
POWER SUPPLY AND APU REDUNDANCY. ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/1R FOR
ENGINE-OUT ABORTS, WHERE LOSS OF ONE APU CAN BE CRITICAL.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/30/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
297 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
DIODE
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT GROUND CONTROL INPUT
FAIL OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT
GROUND CONTROL INPUT DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT PCA 4,5,6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRELAUNCHAPU CONTROLLER ACTIVATION COMMAND. THIS
COMMAND IS NOT NEEDED FOR NORMAL PRELAUNCHACTIVITIES.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-199
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
I0/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALI_ HDW/FUNC
APU FLIGHT: 3/3
298 ABORT: 3/3
"APU SPEED SELECT" SWITCH
FAIL TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
3) SPEED SELECT CIRCUIT
4) SWITCH
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
_TION: P_r_L R2
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HIGH SPEE_CANNOT BE SELECTED FOR AFFECTED APU. NO ADVERSE
EFFECT.
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-200 ....
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/14/86 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 299 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
"APU SPEED SELECT" SWITCH
FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
3) SPEED SELECT CIRCUIT
4) SWITCH
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: " 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL R2
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
APU DROPS FROM HIGH SPEED (113%) TO NORMAL SPEED (103%).
ADVERSE EFFECT.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
NO
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-201
IINDEPENDE_ O_ITER _SESSME_
O_ITER SUBSYSTEM _YSIS WO_HEET
DA_:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC IDz
10/14/86 HIG_ST CRITI_I_
F_G_:
300 _RT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
I_M:
FAIL_ MODE:
"_ SPEED SET._" SWIT_
FAIL TO OP_
_D _YST: J. _S S_SYS _: J. B_S
B_O_ HIE__:
I) APU
2) ET _C_I_ SYSTEM
3) SPEED SET_ CIR_IT
4) SWIT_
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
_TI_LITIES
F_G_ P_E _W/_C _RT HDW/_C
P__: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
_OFF: 3/3 T_: 3/3
OND_IT" 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEO_IT: 3/3 A_: 3/3
_DING/S_ING: 3/3
_D_D_CY S_ENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
_TION: P_L R2
P_T _B_:
_USES: PIE_-P_T S_U_ FAIL_, CO_INATION (SHORT)
EFFE_S/_TION_:
S_CK IN HIGH SPEED. NO _V_E EFFE_.
_FE_CES:
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_PORT DATE 12/10/86 C-202
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
301 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
"APU SPEED SELECT" SWITCH
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
3) SPEED SELECT CIRCUIT
4) SWITCH
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL R2
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION (SHORT)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
APU SHIFTS TO HIGH SPEED. NO ADVERSE EFFECTS.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-203
INDEP_DE_ O_ITER _SESSME_
O_ITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_ET
DATE: 10/14/86
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID: 302
HIGHE 
_ITI_TY
FLIG_:
_ORT:
HDW/_C
3/3
3/3
ITEM: SPEED SE_ CIR_IT
FAIL_ MODE: OPEN CIR_IT
_YST: J. _S SUBSYS _: J. _S
B__ HI__:
Z)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
ET_I_ SYSTEM
SPEED SET_ CIR_IT
_TI_LITIES
FLIG_ P_E HDW/_C _RT _W/_C
__: 3/3 _: 3/3
__: 3/3 T_: 3/3
ONO_IT: 3/3 AOA: _/3
DEO_IT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/S_ING: 3/3
_D_CY S_ENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
__ON: AV _Y 4,5,6
P_T _B_: VS70-460109
MUSES: VIB_TION, _D_NG D_GE, INST_TION E_OR
EFFE_S/_TION_:
_SS OF HIGH SPEED FOR _FE_ED_. NO ADVE_E EFFE_.
_F_CES:
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_PORT DATE 12/10/86 C-204
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
303 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SPEED SELECT CIRCUIT
DRIVER FAIL ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
SPEED SELECT CIRCUIT
.... _TICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDw/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B CNA ] C CNA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4,5,6
VS70-460109
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEPECT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, DUE TO 2 DRIVERS I-N-SERIES. IF BOTH FAIL ON, APU
SHIFTS TO HIGH SPEED. NO ADVERSE EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-205
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/27/86 HIGHEST _ITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 304 ABORT"
ITEM: OVERSPEED/UNDERSPEED INDICATION CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
OVERSPEED/UNDERSPEED INDICATION CIRCUIT
_RITI_3LITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONO_IT: 3/3 AOA: 5/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING" 3/3 _ 7
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 3,4,5,6;AFT BODY;MIDDECK
VS70-460109
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO UNDERSPEED (OR OVERSPEED) SIGNAL TO CAUTION & WARNING SYSTEM
TO GENERATE WARNING LIGHT AND TONE. CREW STILL RECEIVES
SOFTWARE-GENERATED TONE AND CRT MESSAGE. ALSO, NO AUTOMATIC
CLOSURE OF FUEL TANK VALVES.
APU IS SHUT DOWN BY SECONDARY FUEL VALVE ONLY.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-206
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
305 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
"APU AUTO SHUTDOWN" SWITCH
FAIL TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
AUTO SHUTDOWN CONTROL CIRCUIT
SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A CNA ] B C_ ] c C_A ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL R2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE •
CANNOT INHIBIT APT/ AUTO SHUTDOWN. NO ADVERSE EFFECT.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-207
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLI GHT:
306 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
"APU AUTO SHUTDOWN" SWITCH
FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
1) APU
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
3) AUTO SHUTDOWN CONTROL CIRCUIT
SWITCH
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT
3/3
3/3
3/3
2/1R
2/IR
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: PANEL R2
PART NUMBER:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
2/1R
C CNA ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
APU AUTO SHUTDOWN IS ENABLED; IF APUWAS IN "INHIBIT" MODE TO
ALLOW IT TO RUN (DUE TO PREVIOUS FAILURE), THIS WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF APU. CRITICALITY IS 2/1R.
ABORT: CRITI_C_J_ZTYIS 3/5, BECAUSE NO APU WOULD BE RESTARTED IN
"INHIBIT" MODE FOR ASCENT.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 307 ABORT:
ITEM: "APU AUTO SHUTDOWN" SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAIL TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD" J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
AUTO SHUTDOWN CONTROL CIRCUIT
SWITCH
CRITICAI_TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIZ: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:, A [NA ]
LOCATION- PANEL R2
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
APU AUTO SHUTDOWN CANNOT BE ENABLED. NO ADVERSE EFFECT.
REFERENCES •
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
_=_
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-209
DATE"
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
308 ABORT"
"APU AUTO SHUTDOWN" SWITCH
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
AUTO SHUTDOWN CONTROL CIRCUIT
SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF; 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/F_SC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: PANEL R2
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION (SHORT)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
APU AUTO SHUTDOWN IS INHIBITED. NO ADVERSE EFFECT.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-210
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE" 10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 309 ABORT:
ITEM: AUTO SHUTDOWN SWITCH POWER FUSE
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
AUTO SHUTDOWN CONTROL CIRCUIT
SWITCH POWER FUSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: PANEL R2
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, INSTALLATION ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT "INHIBIT" SIGNAL TO 2 APU CONTROLLERS.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-211
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
310 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AUTO SHUTDOWN CONTROL CIRCUIT DIODE
OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
AUTO SHUTDOWN CONTROL CIRCUIT
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT _E HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4,5, 6
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT WINHIBIT" SIGNAL TO ONE APU CONTRO_R.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES :
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-212
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 311 ABORT:
ITEM: AUTO SHUTDOWN CONTROL CIRCUIT DIODE
FAILURE MODE: SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
s)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
AUTO SHUTDOWN CONTROL CIRCUIT
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3"
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4,5,6
PART NUMBER:
CAUSESz CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT "INHIBIT" SIGNAL TO 2 APU CONTROLLERS.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-213
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEMz
MDAC ID:
10/27/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
312 ABORT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL VALVE GROUND CONTROL CIRCUIT
FAIL OFF, OPEN CIRCUIT, FAIL TO REMAIN ON
LEAD ANALYST- J. BARNES S_SYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) APU
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
3) FUEL VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
GROUND CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIG_ PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF_ /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA . AOAs /NA
DEORBITz /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFZNG: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4,5,6
PART NUMBER: VS70-460109
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHORT TO GROUND, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT OPEN VALVE TO DO GROUND PURGE OF FUEL SYSTEM; POSSIBLE
LAUNC_ _Z_Y.
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-214
ww
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/27/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
313 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL VALVE GROUND CONTROL CIRCUIT
INADVERTENT OPERATION, FAIL ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
GROUND CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4,5,6
PART NUMBER: VS70-460109
CAUSES: SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CIRCUIT IS NOT POWERED_ LIFTOFF'_SSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY.
w
REFERENCES:
w
w
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-215
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 314 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL TANK VALVE SWITCH
FAIL TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYSLEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
S)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL TANK VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL R2
ME452-0102-7352
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT OPEN FUEL TANK VALVES FOR ONE APU; APU IS LOST.
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE TO APU REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
I0/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
315 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL TANK VALVE SWITCH
FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL TANK VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: i/I
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ I ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL R2
ME452-0102-7352
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF APU. CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE TO APU REDUNDANCY. ABORT:
CRITICALITY IS I/I FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS, WHERE LOSS OF ONE APU
CAN BE CRITICAL.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-217
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: . 10/15/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 316
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAIL TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST" J. BARNES
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
HDW/_C
1/1
1/1
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL TANK VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
SWITCH
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CRITI_TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCHz 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PANEL R2
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7352
B[P] C[F]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ ......-_ .... ...._
CANNOT CLOSE FUEL TANK VALVES. APU WILL SHUT DOWN WHEN SECONDARY
FUEL VALVE CLOSES. WITHOUT FUEL FLOW, VALVE WILL OVERHEAT FUEL -
CAN _ TO FUEL DETONATION AND FUEL LEAK. THIS CAN CAYUSE FIRE
DURING ENTRY.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 317 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD" J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL TANK VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: .3/3
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [ i]
LOCATION: PANEL R2
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7352
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION (SHORT)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BOTH FUEL TANK VALVES FOR ONE APU OPEN UP. FUEL IS STOPPED BY
SECONDARY FUEL VALVE. WITHOUT FUEL FLOW, VALVE OVERHEATS, AND
FUEL CAN DETONATE, CAUSING FUEL LEAK. THIS CAN CAUSE FIRE DURING
ENTRY.
REFERENCES:
w
w
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-219
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 318 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
2/1R
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE CIRCUIT DRIVER
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OFF, OR SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL TANK VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
CIRCUIT DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT _E HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/_
DEO_IT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA 1,2,3
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
ZFFECTS/_TION_- .......
LOSS OF REDUNDANT FUEL TANK VALVE; OTHER VALVE ALLOWS APU TO
OPERATE. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR DUE TO VALVE AND APU REDUNDANCY.
ABORT: _TICALITY IS 2/_ FOR ENGINE'OUT ABORTS, WHERE LOSS OF
ONE APU CAN BE CRITICAL.
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 319 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE CIRCUIT DRIVER
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL TANK VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
CIRCUIT DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA 1,2,3
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, DUE TO OTHER CIRCUIT DRIVER IN SERIES. IF BOTH
DRIVERS FAILED ON, VALVE COULD OVERHEATAND DETONATE FUEL (FIRE
HAZARD DURING ENTRY). CRITICALITY IS 2/IR: 1 FAILURE AWAY FROM
CRITICALITY I.
NOTE: FOR APU 2, VALVE B, CRITICALITY IS 3/IR DUE TO 3 DRIVERS
IN SERIES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-221
I_EPEND_ ORBITER_SESSMENT
ORBITERSUBSYSTEMANALYSISWORKSHEET
DATE: 10/15/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 320
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL TANK VALVE AUTO SHUTDOWNDRIVER
FAIL OFF, OR SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
I)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL TANK VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
AUTO SHUTDOWN DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCR: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3.
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4,5,6
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, INSTALLATION ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONA_LE:
AUTOMATIC S_TDO.N Or APU WILL NOT CLOSE ONE Or THE TWO FUEL T_K
VALVES. _U_ WILL SS sm_r DOw. sY SECOm_ARY n_L VALVE.
REFERENCES:
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 321 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE AUTO SHUTDOWN DRIVER
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
t)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL TANK VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
AUTO SHUTDOWN DRIVER
f_ITI f2_LITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AFT LCA 1,2,3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE OF THE TWO FUEL TANK VALVES FOR ONE APU. THE OTHER
VALVE ALLOWS THE APU TO CONTINUE OPERATING. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR
DUE TO REDUNDANCY OF VALVES AND APUIS.
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS, WHERE LOSS OF
ONE APU CAN BE CRITICAL.
REFERENCES •
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 322 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/1R
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE SWITCH POWER FUSE
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
e)
o)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL TANK VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
SWITCH POWER FUSE
(_tTTZ_KLZTXZ8
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION: PANEL R2
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES:
EFFE_S/RATIONALE: ........
LOsso,o,,o, REDUND VALV'S
CRITICALITY IS 3/IR DUE TO VALVE AND APU REDUNDANCY. ABORT:
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR _GINE'0UT _RTs, _ LO-SS OF ONE APU
CAN BE CRITICAL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-224
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
323 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL TANK VALVE SWITCH OUTPUT DIODE
FAIL OPEN, OR SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL TANK VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
SWITCH OUTPUT DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENSz A [ 2 ] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA 1,2,3
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE OF THE REDUNDANT FUEL TANK VALVES FOR ONE APU.
CRITICALITY IS 3/IR DUE TO VALVE AND APU REDUNDANCY. ABORT:
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS, WHERE LOSS OF ONE APU
CAN BE CRITICAL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-225
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID"
10/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
324 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL TANK VALVE INDICATOR SWITCH
FAIL OPEN, FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL TANK VALVE INDICATOR SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC284-0558-000X
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
E FECrS/RATI0  .
FUEL TANK VALVE POSITION INDICATOR ALWAYS SHOWS "CLOSED" FOR
AFFECTED VALVE. CANmT TELL VALVE FAILURE FROM INDICATOR FAILURE,
DUE TO REDUND_ VALVE IN PARA_L. AsS_'ME VALVE ?AILURE. _°
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 325 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE INDICATOR SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAIL TO OPEN, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL TANK VALVE INDICATOR SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY S_%EENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC284-0558-000X
CAUSES: SHORT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUEL TANK VALVE POSITION INDICATION ALWAYS shows "OPEN" FOR
AFFECTED VALVE, BUT DOWNSTREAM READING COI_FIRMS VALVE CLOSED
(GROUND ONLY).
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-227
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/12/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 326
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLI GHT: 2/ 1R
ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
"PUMP/VLV COOL" SWITCH
FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
s)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT
"PUMP/VLV COOL" SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLXG_ _E HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DE-0RBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: PANEL R2
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7301
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LOSS OF ONE OF TWO FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEMS. CRITICALITY
IS 2/_R FOR DEORBZT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT CAN
CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
327 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
"PUMP/VLV COOL" SWITCH
FAIL TOOPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
S)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT
"PUMP/VLV COOL" SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: PANEL R2
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7301
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION (SHORT)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT DEACTIVATE COOLING SYSTEM; VALVES MAY OVERHEAT AND BE
DAMAGED. NO ADVERSE EFFECTS, OTHERWISE.
w
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INDEPENDENTORBITERASS_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
328 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
"PUMP/VLV COOL" SWITCH
INADVERTENTOPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. _S r SUBSYS LEXD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT
"PUMP/VLV COOL" SWITCH
CRITICU_TIES -
FLIG_ _PHASE HDW/FUNC ..... ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
0NORBIT: 3/3 AOA: _/31
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: " 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANC-Y_SCREENS: _ [_2 ] BrP] C[P]
LOCAT.IO_N: _ PANEL R2 _
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7301 .......
a
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION (SHORT)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE COOLING SYSTEM IS ACTIVATED AND OPERATES UNTIL DEPLETION OF
WATER. CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU
STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 329 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: "PUMP/VLV COOL" SWITCH POWER FUSE
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
_)
V)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT
SWITCH POWER FUSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] c[P]
LOCATION: PANEL R2
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, INSTALLATION ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE SWITCH CONTACT: LOSS OF REDUNDANT CONTROL CIRCUIT TO
2 APU COOLING VALVES IN ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT COOLING SYSTEMS.
CRITICALITY IS 3/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. OTHERWISE,
u
REFERENCES:
m
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INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 330 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT POWER FUSE
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT
CONTROL CIRCUIT POWER FUSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
_T_,UNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 . AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION: APU TIMER BOX i,2,3
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF ONE OF TWO PATHS TO OPEN WATER COOLING VALVE FOR ONE OF
TWO REDUNDANT COOLING SYSTEMS. CRITICAI_TY IS 3/IR FOR DEORBIT
BEF0_ APU _.
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SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
APU FLIGHT: 3/IR
331 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
DIODE
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT POWER INPUT
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT
POWER INPUT DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
APU TIMER BOX 1,2,3
JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO WATER COOLING VALVE THERMOSTAT.
CRITICALITY IS 3/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED
HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-233
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
APU FLIGHT: 3/ 1R
332 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
DIODE
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT POWER INPUT
SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERAR_:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) APU
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
3) FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT
POWER INPUT DIODE
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH =
LIFTOFF"
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER."
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3 : : :
A[2]
TIMER BOX 1,2,3
_TANTXV IN4246
B[F] C [P]
CAUSES : CONTAMINATION ....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO REDUNDANT VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT, WHEN FUSE
STAR EOHOT CAUSE TO DETONATE.
APU
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
333 ABORT:
ITEM:
RESISTOR
FAILURE MODE:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT INPUT
FAIL OPEN, OR HIGH RESISTANCE
SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNESLEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT
POWER INPUT DIODE
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
•ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
B[F] C [ P]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: APU TIMER BOX 1,2,3
PART NUMBER: RER65F2150M
CAUSES : VIBRATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO WATER COOLING VALVE THERMOSTAT.
CRITICALITY IS 3/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. IF
THERMOSTAT IS LOST, ONE COOLING SYSTEM IS LOST FOR ONE APU.
STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
APU
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-235
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RESISTOR
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
334 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
311R
FUEL PUMP/GGVMCOOLINGCONTROLCIRCUIT INPUT
INTERNAL SHORT, LOWRESISTANCE, OR SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT
POWER INPUT RESISTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS- 3/3
LIFTOFFs 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SA/_ING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
APU TIMER BOX 1,2,3
RER65F215OH
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO REDUNDANT VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT, =WHEN FUSE
BLOWS. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFO_ __O_WN.
VALV_ _iS LOSTZO_ _OOLIN_ SYSTE}(I I_rLOST TO O_-E AINU. APU
STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-236
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
APU FLIGHT: 3/IR
335 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
DRIVER
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT POWER INPUT
FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT
POWER INPUT HYBRID CIRCUIT DRIVER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH-
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/1R ATO: 3/1R
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION: APU TIMER BOX 1,2,3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO ONE APU COOLING VALVE. CRITICALITY IS
3/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. IF VALVE IS LOST, ONE
COOLING SYSTEM IS LOST FOR ONE APU. APU STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE
FUEL TO DETONATE.
w
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-237
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
10/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
APU FLIGHT: 3/3
336 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
DRIVER
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT POWER INPUT
FAIL ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT
POWER INPUT HYBRID CIRCUIT DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: APU TIMER BOx 1,2,3
PART_: HC477_02_63-0002
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT DUE TO REDUNDANT DRIVER IN SERIES. IF BOTH FAILED ON,
WITH APU CONTROLLER ON, COOLING VALVE WOULD OPEN, BUT WATER TANK
V_VE WOULD PREVENT WATER FLO--W, WI-TH_LI_G _ATED, WATER
COULD FLOW CONTINUALLY AND BE DEPLETED EARLY (REDUNDANT COOLING
SYSTEM WOULD BE UNAFFECTED).
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-238
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
APU FLIGHT: 3/ IR
337 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
DRIVER
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT POWER INPUT
SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT
POWER INPUT HYBRID CIRCUIT DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
LOCATION: APU TIMER BOX 1,2,3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE EFFECT IS LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO ONE APU COOLING
VALVE. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU
STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
z
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-239
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
338 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
DRIVER
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT TIMING
FAIL OFF, FAIL ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
s)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM ......
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT _
TIMING DRIVER
-_Ti_TIES
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/I
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
A [NA ]
APU TIMER BOX 1,2,3
MC477-026200002
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, _FACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE IS ONE COOLING VALVE .......STUCK OPEN FOR ONE APU, _IL E
THAT COOLING SYSTEM IS ACTIVE. THIS SYSTEM CAN BE TURNED OFF, AND
OTHER SYS_M IS UNAFFECTED.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-240
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
339 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING VALVE POWERDIODE
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT
VALVE POWER DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT" 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: APU TIMER BOX 1,2,3
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
B[F] C[P]
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO ONE APU COOLING VALVE. CRITICALITY IS
3/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE
FUEL TO DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-241
INDEPENDENTORBITER _SESSM_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORI_HEET
DATE: 11/12/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 340
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/iR
ABORT: 3/ 1R
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVN COOLING VALVE POWER DIODE
FAILURE MODE: SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
S)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT
VALVE POWER DIODE
_ITI_ITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LAN_ING/SA_ING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
APU TIMER BOX 1,2,3
J_XVIN5551
cCP] _:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
E_S/_T_0NAL_: _ _
LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO APU COOLING VALVE, AFTER FUSE BLOWS IN
CIRCUIT DRIVER. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU
COOLDO_TN. _ STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATEz 10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 341 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING VALVE INDICATION RESISTOR
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN, OR HIGH RESISTANCE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT
VALVE INDICATION RESISTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFFc 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: APU TIMER BOX 1,2,3
PART NUMBER: RLRO705101GR
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF STATUS INDICATION FOR ONE APU COOLING VALVE. NONCRITICAL
MEASUREMENT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-243
INDEPEND_ O_ITER _SESSME_
O_ITER SUBSYSTEM _YSIS WO_ET
DA_:
SU_YSTEM:
MDAC ID"
10/20/86 HIG_ST _ITI_TY HDW/_C
F_G_: 3/3
342 _RT: 3/3
I_:
FAIL_ MODE:
_L _P/_VM C_NG V_VE I_I_TION _SISTOR
I__ SHORT, OR _W _SIST_CE
_YST: J. _S SU_YS _: J. B_S
B__ HIE__:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
APU
ET._I_ SYS_M
_L _MP/_VM COOLING COBOL CIR_IT
V_VE INDI_TION _SISTOR
_TI_TIES
F_G_ P_E HDW/_C _RT
__: 3/3 RT_:
_OFF: 3/3 T_:
ONO_IT: 3/3 AOA:
DEO_IT: 3/3 ATO:
_DING/S_ING: 3/3
HDW/nmC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
_D_D_CY S_ENS: A [NA ]
_TION: _ TIMER BOX 1,2,3
P_T __HBER: _OT05101GR
B [NA ] C [NA ]
MUSES: CO_INATION
EFFE_S/_Ti0N_: .....
_SS OF STA_S I_I_TION FOR O_ _ _NG V_VE. NON_ITI_
MEASUREMENT.
_F_CES:
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_PORT DATE 12/10/86 C-244
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1i/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBS YSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 343 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING TANK VALVE POWER FUSE
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT
TANK VALVE POWER FUSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT:. 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDWlFUNC
3/3
313
313
311R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] cCP]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
APU TIMER BOX 1,2,3
ME452-0018-0100
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, INSTALLATION ERROR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE OF 3 REDUNDANT POWER SOURCES FOR ONE OF 2 COOLING
SYSTEM WATER TANK VALVES. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE
APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-245
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
344 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING TANK VALVE DRIVER
FAIL OFF, OPEN CIRCUIT, SHORT TO GROUND
HDW/FUNC
311R
311R
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT
WATER TANK VALVE DRIVER
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEO_IT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 9. ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
APU TIMER BOX 1,2,3
MC477-0263-0002 _- _ _ _ =_- _ ......
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIOB_I_ :._ ............
LOSS OF ONE OF 3 REDUNDANT DRIVERS FOR ONE OF 2cOoLING sYSTEM
WATER TANKVALVES. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU
COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT _ CAUSE PUEL TO DETONATE. _......
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INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
345 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING TANK VALVE DRIVER
FAIL ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT
WATER TANK VALVE DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: APU TIMER BOX 1,2,3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WATER TANK VALVE OPENS AS SOON AS APU CONTROLLER IS POWERED UP.
WATER CONTROL VALVE DOWNSTREAM PREVENTS WATER DEPLETION. VALVE
MAY OVERHEAT. NO OTHER EFFECTS.
REFERENCES:
m
w
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-247
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
Ii/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
346 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING THERMOSTAT
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
s)
4)
s)
8)
9}
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT
THERMOSTAT
_TICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH z 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL" 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] _[P; cCP]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
Er_cTS/_TXON_:
LOSS OF ONE OF TWO COOLING SYSTEMS FOR ONE _. CRITICALITY IS
2/IR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE
FUEL TO DETONATE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
347 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING THERMOSTAT
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
_)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT
THERMOSTAT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF" 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION (SHORT)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COOLING VALVE PULSES CONTINUOUSLY, REGARDLESS OF APU TEMPERATURE,
BUT CAN BE TURNED OFF BY SWITCH. POSSIBLE DEPLETION OF COOLING
WATER FROM ONE SYSTEM.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12110186 C-249
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 348 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: "APU HEATER-TANK/FUEL LINE/H20 SYS" SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD- J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
s)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL/H20 HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT
SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
I=_,_.UNCR: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR " ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: PANEL AI2
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _
LOSS OF ONE SET OF HEATERS FOR ONE APUIS FUEL TANK, FUEL LINES,
AND WATER LINES, PLUS REDUNDANT HEATERS FOR ONE WATER TANK AND
COMMON WATER LINES. LOSS OF BOTH SETS OF HEATERS WOULD ALLOW
LINES TO _EZE, RESULTING IN LOSS OF ONE APU.
CRITICALITY IS 3/IR DUE TO HEATER AND APU REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
349 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM"
FAILURE MODEz
APU HEATER, TANK/FUEL LINE/H20 SYS SWITCH
FAIL TO OPEN, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
31
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL/H20 HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT
SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS; 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: PANEL AI2
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION (SHORT)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT DEACTIVATE ONE SET OF HEATERS FOR ONE APU'S FUEL TANK,
FUEL LINES, AND WATER LINES, PLUS REDUNDANT HEATERS FOR ONE WATER
TANK AND COMMON WATER LINES. NO ADVERSE EFFECTS. OTHER SET OF
HEATERS UNAFFECTED.
REFERENCES_
u
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-251
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I0/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID" 350 ABORT:
ITEM: FUEL/H20 HEATERCONTROLCIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: OPEN CIRCUIT, SHORT TO GROUND
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL/H20 LINE HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: ' 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SA_ING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4,5,6
PART NUMBER: VS70-460109
CAUSES: INSTALLATION ERROR, HANDLING DAMAGE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ,
LOSS OF ONE SET OF REDUNDANT HEATERS FOR ONE APU°S FUEL TANK,
FUEL LINES, OR WATER LINES, OR ONE WATER TANK. LOSS OF BOTH SETS
OF HEATERS WOULD ALLOW LINES TO FREEZE, RESULTING IN, AS A WORST
CASE, LOSS OF ONE APU. _TICALITY IS 3/IR DUE TO HEATER
AND APU REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
351 ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/IR
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUEL/H20 HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT
CIRCUIT DRIVER FAIL ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL/H20 LINE HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: .3/3
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/ 1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C IF]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4,5,6 (AFT LCA 1,2,3)
VS70-460109
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, DUE TO MULTIPLE DRIVERS IN SERIES. IF ALL DRIVERS
FAILED ON, HEATERS WOULD BE FAILED ON, LEADING TO OVERHEATING AND
FUEL DETONATION. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR, DUE TO ENTRY FIRE HAZARD
BEING TWO FAILURES AWAY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86
c-253 C -
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT: i/1
MDAC ID: 352 ABORT: I/i
ITEM: FUEL/H20 HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: FUEL PUMP DRAIN LINE HEATER THERMOSTAT INPUT
DRIVER FAIL ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FUEL/H20 LINE HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT
FUEL PUMP DRAIN LINE HEATER THERMOSTAT INPUT DRIVER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [HA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4,5,6 (AFT LCA 1,2,3)
PART NUMBER: VS70-460109
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HEATER IS STUCK ON IF HEATER SWITCH IS IN "AUTO" POSITION - IF
mm
l
g
[]
m
|
m
[]
m
mm
m
i
[]
FUEL IS PRESENT IN LINELIT _LL OVERHEAT _ DETONATE BEFO_ FDA
_u_. _-ZL LE_ - FIHE HAZARD. CRITI_ITY IS i/1 D_ TO n_
HAZARD.
REFERENCES: ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL RECOM_M_DED CIL CHANGE 6-13-
86 (CIL 1219.2). ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL PRESENTATION "APU DRAIN
LINE HEATER SAFETY CONCERN", PRESENTED BY J.L. SCHAEFER, JUNE
1986.
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-254
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORB_ SUB_T___S W_RKSHEET
APU
353
HIG_ST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
"APU HEATER-GAS GEN/FUEL PUMP" SWITCH
FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL _ REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
GG/FUEL PUMP HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT
SWITCH
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 . RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/_ ATO: 3/12
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] s[P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE z
LOSS OF ONE SET OF GAS GENERATOR BED HEATERS AND FUEL PUMP/GGVM
HEATERS, FOR ONE APU. IF BOTH SETS OF HEATERS ARE LOST, FUEL CAN
FREEZE AND APU WILL BE LOST. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR DUE TO HEATER
AND APU REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES •
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-255
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
354 ABORT:
HDW/_C
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
"APU HEATER-GAS GEN/FUEL PUMP" SWITCH
FAIL TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
GG/FUEL PUMP HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT
SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PANEL A12
PART NUMBER:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/1R
SiP] C[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION (SHORT)
EFFECTS/RK_: _ _ _ _ __
CANNOT DEACTIVATE ONE SET OF HEATERS OR ACTIVATE REDUNDANT SET
(FOR ONE APU ). STARTING APU WILL AUTOMATICALLY INHIBIT THESE
HEATERS. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR DUE TO HZATER AND APU REDUNDANCY.
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-256
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 355 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/!R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GAS GEN/FUEL PUMP HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT, SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
GG/FUEL PUMP HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS r 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT LCA 1,2,3
VS70-460109
CAUSES: INSTALLATION ERROR, HANDLING DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT HEATERS FOR ONE APU'S GAS GENERATOR
BED OR GGVM/FUEL PUMP. LOSS OF BOTH HEATERS WOULD ALLOW FUEL TO
FREEZE, CAUSING LOSS OF APU. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR DUE TO HEATER
AND APU REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-257
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ii/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
356 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GAS GEN/FUEL PUMP HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT
CIRCUIT DRIVER FAIL ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
s)
a)
9)
_PU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
GG/FUEL PUMP HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS:
LIFTOFF:_ 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
2/iR
C[F]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: AFT IF.A 1,2,3
PART NUMBER: VS70-460109
SiP]
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .....
NO EFFECT, DUE TO TWO DRIVERS IN SERIES. IF BOTH DRIVERS FAILED
ON, ONE APUtS GAS GENERATOR BED HEATER OR FUEL PUMP/GGVM HEATER
WOULD BE FAILED ON, RESULTING IN FUEL OVERHEATING AND DETONATION.
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR (ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM CRITICALITY 1/1).
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 357 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
"APU HEATER, LUBE OIL LINE" SWITCH
FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3_
4_
5)
6)
8_
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
LUBE OIL LINE HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT
SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE IS LOSS OF ALL LUBE OIL LINE HEATERS FOR ONE APU; LUBE
OIL TEMP WILL DROP BELOW 0DEG. F. AND APU WILL BE LOST.
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE TO APU REDUNDANCY.
w
r
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-259
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1I/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 358 ABORT:
ITEM: "APU HEATER, LUBE OIL LINE" SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAIL TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
LUBE OIL LINE HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT
SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORSIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT z 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LAND_NG/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL AI2
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION (SHORT), PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE SET OF LUBE OIL LINE HEATERS IS FAILED ON, AND OTHER SET
CAN'T BE ACTIVATED (WORST CASE). CRITICALITY IS 3/IR, SINCE
HEATER REDUNDANCY IS LOST FOR ONE APU.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-260
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
359 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
"APU HEATER, LUBE OIL LINE" SWITCH
INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
LUBE OIL LINE HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT
SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION(SHORT), VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE SET OF LUBE OIL LINE HEATERS IS FAILED ON; OTHER SET IS
UNAFFECTED. NO ADVERSE EFFECTS ON APU.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-261
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE: OPEN CIRCUIT
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
II/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
360 ABORT:
LUBE OIL LINE HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES sussYs LE_: J. BAR_s
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
S)
7)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
LUBE OIL LINE HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITI_TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4,5,6
vs_o-4sozo9
CAUSES: HANDLING DAMAGE, INSTALLATION ERROR
E_S/_AT_ONALZ: _
WORST CASE IS LOSS or ONE OF TWO SETS OF LUBE OIL LINE HEATERS
• OR ONE _--'_. I_ _ mTn_s _z _OST, _ OIL _MP WIZ_ DROP
BELOW 0 DEG. F. AND APU WILL BE LOST. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR DUE TO
HEATER AND APU REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-262
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
361 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LUBE OIL LINE HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT
DRIVER FAIL ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
APU
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
LUBE OIL LINE HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBITI 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4,5,6
VS70-460109
"CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT, DUE TO 3 DRIVERS IN SERIES. IF ALL DRIVERS FAILED ON,
HEATER WOULD BE FAILED ON. NO ADVERSE EFFECTS ON APU.
1
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-263
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/23/85 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 362 ABORT:
ITEM: BITE INITIATE DRIVER
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OFF, FAIL TO REMAIN ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
MM
m
g
Z
mm
m
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM m
3) BITE CIRCUIT
4) DRIVER
5) ..
6)
7)
8) =
9) u
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
BITE
B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT LCA 1,2,3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATION--ALE:
NO BITE FUNCTION FOR APU CONTROLLER-POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY.
IS NOT USED DURING FLIGHT.
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-264
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mINDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMAN YSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 363 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: BITE INITIATE DRIVER
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
3) BITE CIRCUIT
4) DRIVER
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA • TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT LCA 1,2,3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALEz
FAILURE IS ONLY POSSIBLE PRE-LAUNCH, ANDWILL INHIBIT APU START -
LAUNCH DELAY. THIS DRIVER RECEIVES NO POWER AFTER LIFTOFF.
REFERENCES:
u
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-265
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/21/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 364
n
ITEM: "APU FUEL/H20 QTY" GAUGE
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT, OR _ONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) DISPLAYS
3) FUEL QUANTITY GAUGE
4)
s)
6)
71
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC - _ _RT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
OI_ORBIT: 3/3 AOA: .3/3
DEORBITz 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL F8
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
V:BRA_, _CAL SHO_, C_AT:ON
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FUEL QUANTITY READING FOR ONE APU. FUEL TANK PRESSURE
STILL AVAILABLE TO CREW ON CRT (2 READINGS), AND TELEMETERED TO
GROUND. APU STILL USABLE WITH ALL THESE MEASUREMENTS LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-266
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nINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
365 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
"APU FUEL/H20 QTY" SWITCH
FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) DISPLAYS
3) FUEL QUANTITY GAUGE
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA" 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: PANEL F8
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FUEL QUANTITY MEASUREMENT FOR ALL 3 APU'S. FUEL TANK
PRESSURE STILL AVAILABLE TO CREW ON CRT AND TELEMETERED TO
GROUND. APU STILL USABLE WITH ALL THESE MEASUREMENTS LOST.
REFERENCES:
i
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-267
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDACID; 366 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: "APU FUEL/H20 (_TY" SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAIL TO OPEN, INADVERTANT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) DISPLAYS
3) FUEL QUANTITY GAUGE
4)
5)
6)
77
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS; 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:, A [NA ]
LOCATION: PANEL F8
PART NU_3ER: _
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION (SHORT), PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
VIBRATION _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GAUGE ONLY _S FUEL QUANTITY, NO WATER SPRAY BOILER WATER
QUANTITY.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 367 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: "APU FUEL PRESS" GAUGE
FAILURE MODE_ NO OUTPUT, OR ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) DISPLAYS
3) FUEL PRESSURE GAUGE
4)
s)
6)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: PANEL F8
PART NUMBER: .
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FUEL PRESSURE READING FOR ALL 3 APU'S; FUEL PRESSURE IS
STILL AVAILABLE ON CRT (2 READINGS) AND TELEMETERED TOGROUND.
FUEL QUANTITY AVAILABLE IN GAUGE AND TELEMETERED TO GROUND. APU'S
STILL USABLE WITH ALL MEASUREMENTS LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-269
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/21/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 368
ITEM: "APU EGT" GAUGE
FAILURE MODEz NO OUTPUT,
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDwIFUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
OR ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARN_S
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
DISPLAYS
EXHAUST GAS TEMPERATURE GAUGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFFz 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT_ 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: PANEL F8
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF EGT READING FOR ALL 3 APU'S; EGT IS STILL AVAILABLE ON
CRT (2 READINGS) AND TELEMETERED TO___TKE GROUND. APU'S _ STILL
USABLE Win _ _G%-M___S LOST, ......
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 369 ABORT:
ITEM: "APU OIL TEMP" GAUGE
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT, OR ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
DISPLAYS
LUBE OIL TEMPERATURE GAUGE
• CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF= 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL F8
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, PICE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF OIL TEMP READING FOR ALL 3 APU'S. OIL TEMP IS STILL
AVAILABLE TO CREW ON CRT (2 READINGS + 2 GEARBOX TEMP READINGS),
AND TELEMETERED TO GROUND. APU IS STILL USABLE WITH ALL OIL TEMP
MEASUREMENTS LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-271
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC IDI 370 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: GAUGING APU SELECT SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) DISPLAYS
3) GAUGING APU SELECT SWITCH
4)
5)
6)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_N-C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF:" 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
RED_DANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: PANEL F8
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
ME_I_SH0C_K _ i_........
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE EFFECT IS LOSS OF EGT, FUEL PRESSURE, AND OIL TEMP
READINGS FOR ALL 3_'S. ALL ARE BACKED UP _ IC_RT _D_NGS AND
TELEMETRY. APU IS USABLE WITH ALL TEESE MEASUREMENTS LOST.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-272
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
371 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GAUGING APU SELECT SWITCH
FAIL TO OPEN, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) DISPLAYS
3) GAUGING APU SELECT SWITCH
4)
5)
6)
_)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: PANEL F8
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION (SHORT),
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE EFFECT, GAUGE READS EGT, FUEL PRESSURE, AND OIL TEMP
FOR ONE APU ONLY. OTHER APU READINGS ARE BACKED UP BY CRT
READINGS AND TELEMETRY. APU'S ARE USABLE WITH ALL THESE
MEASUREMENTS LOST.
REFERENCES:
W
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-273
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
372 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
"APU/HYD READY TO START" TALKBACK
FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) APU
2) DISPLAYS
3) READY-TO-START TALKBACK
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
r
.... CR!TICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: . 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: PANEL R2
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES :kLOGICFAILURE , CONT_INATION , OPEN CIRCUIT, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
APU NEVER SHOWS "READY TO START" CONDITION. CONDITIONS _ BE
VERIFIED BY CRT OR TELEMETRY; APU IS OKAY TO START.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/2 i/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 373 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: "APU/HYD READY TO START" TALKBACK
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DISPLAYS
READY-TO-START TALKBACK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [ N ]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL R2
CAUSES: LOGIC FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
APU ALWAYS SHOWS "READY TO START" CONDITION. CONDITION CAN BE
VERIFIED BY CRT OR TELEMETRY. APU IS OKAY TO START.
REFERENCES:
w
m
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-275
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODEz
INDEPENDENT ORBITER AssESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYST_H _ALYSlS WO_S_ET
10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
374 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
211R
GEARBOX N2 PRESSURE SENSOR V46P0151A(251,351)
NO OUTPUT, OR ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
e)
v)
s)
9)
APU
INSTRUMENTATION
GEARBOX N2 PRESSURE SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART _ER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, HANDLING DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF OUTPUT IS BELOW 5.5 PSIA, APUWILL NOT START EXCEPT IN
OVERRIDE. GEARBOX PRESSURIZATION VALVE STAYS OPEN AFTER APU
STAR, P, DUMPS GN2 BOTTLE INTO GEARBOX. A G_X LEAK OR GN2
LEAK CAN CAUSE LOSS OF APU.
CRITICALITY IS 3/IR (GN2 LEAK + ANOTHER APU LOST - CRITICALITY
i). ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/1R FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS, WHERE LOSS
OF i APU CAN BE CRITICAL.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 375 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: GAS GENERATOR BED TEMPERATURE SENSOR
V46TOI22A(222,322)
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT, OR ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: 0'. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
GAS GENERATOR BED TEMP. SENSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, HANDLING DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SENSOR, OR READING <190 F, MEANS LOSS OF NORMAL APU
START; APU MUST BE STARTED IN OVERRIDE MODE. ALSO, GAS GENERATOR
BED HEATERS ARE ON CONTINUOUSLY IN AUTO MODE IF SENSOR OUTPUT IS
SHIFTED LOW, OR MUST REVERT TO BACKUP THERMOSTAT CONTROL
IF SENSOR OUTPUT IS SHIFTED HIGH. NO EFFECT WHILE APU IS
RUNNING. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR DUE TO LOSS OF 1 OF 2 METHODS FOR
STARTING AN APU, AND APT] REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-277
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
376 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM: FUEL TEST LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR V46T0183A
(283,383) V46T0184A (284,384)
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT, OR ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
INSTRUMENTATION
FUEL TEST LINE TEMPERATURE SENSORS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ME449-0160-0003
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, k PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, HANDLING DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RAT!_N_-_ _ ................._/iii......... _,_ _ _ __BOTH SENSORS ARZ MOUNTED ON n_L LI_ CLAXP X LOOS_E_C_P CAN
RENDER BOTH SENSORS USELESS. WITH NO TEMPERATURE SENSING, A
FAILED-ON HEATER CAN CAUSE FUEL DETONATION AND FIRE HAZARD.
CRITICALITY IS 3/IR (HEATER FAILED ON + 2 SENSORS FAILED -_ _
CRITICAL).
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-278
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 377
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/1R
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: FUEL PUMP SEAL _VITY DRAIN LINE TEMPERATURE
SENSOR V46T0186A (286,386) V46T0170A (270,370)
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT, OR ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
FUEL PUMP SEAL CAVITY DRAIN
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/3 . TAL:
3/IR AOA:
3/1R ATO:
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT COMPARTMENT
ME449-0160-0003
B[P] C IF]
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, HANDLING DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BOTH SENSORS ARE MOUNTED ON DRAIN LINE CLAMP -A L_X)S _ CLAMp CAN
RENDER BOTH SENSORS USELESS. WITH NO TEMPERATURE SENSING, AND
FUEL IN THE LINE FROM A FUEL PUMP SEAL LEAK, A FAILED-ON HEATER
CAN CAUSE FUEL DETONATION AND FIRE HAZARD.
CRITICALITY IS 3/1R (FUEL PUMP SEAL LEAK + HEATER FAILED ON + 2
SENSORS FAILED - CRITICAL).
REFERENCES :
w
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-279
RINDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/21/86
SUBSYSTEM: APU
MDAC ID: 378
i
ITEM: NONCRITICAL INSTRUMENTATION
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT, OR ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ANALYST: J. BARNES s Ys
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHYz
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
APU
INSTRUMENTATION
NONCRITICAL INSTRUMENTATION
_ITX_TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBTT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT
PART _BER: NA
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHORT CIRCUIT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT,
_DLING DAMAGE _ _ { __
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT - APU IS STILL USABLE WITH LOSS OF ALL BACKUP
MEASUREMENTS. NOTE: THIS CATEGORY INCLUDES ALL TRANSDUCERS NOT
LISTED INDIVIDUALLY.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 379 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: CONTROLLER SAFETY MONITORING
FAILURE MODE: NO SHUTDOWN SIGNAL
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) CONTROLLER
3) SAFETY MONITORING
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: •2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4,5,6
MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO AUTOMATIC SHUTDOWN FOR APUOVERSPEED OR UNDERSPEED; POSSIBLE
APU TURBINE OVERSPEED AND STRUCTURAL FAILURE. CRITICALITY IS
2/1R: 1 FAILURE AWAY FROM CRITICALITY 1/1.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-281
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
m
m
DATE: 11/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT: 2/1R
MDAC ID: 380 ABORT: i/I
ITEM: CONTROLLER SAFETY MONITORING m
FAILURE MODE: SPURIOUS SHUTDOWN SIGNAL
LF_D ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LF_D: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) APU
2) CONTROLLER
3) SAFETY MONITORING
4) __
5) m
6)
9)
FLIUHT_Z HDW/_ ...... _eORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: i/! m
0NORBIT: 2/IR AOA: i/1 |
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
mREDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4,5,6
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION
ONE APU WILL SHUT DOWN. CAN BE RESTARTED IN "INHIBIT _I MODE.
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE TO APU REDUNDANCY.
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS i/i FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS, WHERE LOSS OF 1
APU CAN BE CRITICAL.
REFERENCES :
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Ii_DEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1I/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 381 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
2/IR
ITEM: CONTROLLER POWER SUPPLY
FAILURE MODE: OPEN CIRCUIT, OR SHORT CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) CONTROLLER
3) POWER SUPPLY
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ I] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4,5,6
MC201-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BROKEN WIRE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO APU CONTROLLER; IF BOTH POWER SUPPLIES
ARE LOST, ONE APU IS LOST. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR, DUE TO POWER
SUPPLY AND APU REDUNDANCY.
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS, WHERE LOSS OF
ONE APU CAN BE CRITICAL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-283
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMAI_ALYSISWORKSHEET
DATE: 11/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 382 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/1R
ITEM: CONTROLLER PRIMARY SPEED CONTROL
FAILURE MODE" LOSS OF OUTPUT, INTERMITTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBS¥S LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) APU
2) CONTROLLER
3) SPEED CONTROL
4) PRIMARY SPEED CONTROL
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITI_TIES
FLIG_ PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONO_IT: 3/ IR AOA: 2/'IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4,5,6
MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .......................
LOSS OF OUTPUT TO PRIMARY FUEL VALVE; APU SHIFTS TO HIGH SPEED
(113%) AS SECONDARY VALVE TAKES OVER. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR DUE TO
REDUNDANCY OF SPEED CONTROL CIRCUITS AND APU'S.-_ _ _
ABORT- C:RITI__ iS 2/IR _FOR ENGINE'O_ ABORTS, WHERE LOSS OF
ONE APU CAN BE CRITICAL.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-284
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ii/0S/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
383 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/!R
1/I
ITEMI
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER PRIMARY SPEED CONTROL
OUTPUT FAILED ON, SPURIOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) APU
2) CONTROLLER
3) SPEED CONTROL
4) PRIMARY SPEED CONTROL
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: I/1
ONORBI T: 2/ IR AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4,5,6
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
PRIMARY FUEL VALVE CLOSES, SHUTTING DOWN APU. CRITICALITY IS
2/IR DUE TO APU REDUNDANCY.
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 1/1 FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS, WHERE LOSS OF
ONE APU CAN BE CRITICAL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-285
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
384 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER SECONDARY SPEED CONTROL
LOSS OF OUTPUT, INTERMITTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
APU
CONTROLLER
SPEED CONTROL
SECONDARY SPEED CONTROL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: i/I
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4,5,6
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECONDARY FUEL VALVE CLOSES, SHUTTING DOWN APU. CRITICALITY IS
2/1R DUZ TO APU R_DUNDANC"Z.
ABORT: CRITI__ iS I/I FOR ENGI_'OUT ABORTS, _ LOSS OF
ONE APU CAN BE CRITICAL.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-286
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 385 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER SECONDARY SPEED CONTROL
OUTPUT FAILED ON, SPURIOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
CONTROLLER
SPEED CONTROL
SECONDARY SPEED CONTROL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[F]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4,5,6
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
SECONDARY FUEL VALVE IS HELD OPEN. NO EFFECT UNLESS APU IS TAKEN
TO HIGH SPEED - THEN, TURBINE WILL OVERSPEED AND COME APART.
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR: 1 FAILURE AWAY FROM CRITICALITY i.
AUTO SHUTDOWN SHUTS FUEL TANK VALVES, BUT TURBINE CAN STILL
OVERSPEED TO DESTRUCTION ON RESIDUAL FUEL LEFT IN LINES.
REFERENCES :
m
m
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-287
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: Ii/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 386 ABORT:
ITEM: CONTROLLER APU START LOGIC
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, I_RMITTENT OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
1/1
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBS¥S LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2) CONTROLLER
3) APU START LOGIC
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREEns: A_ 1 ]
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 1/1
2/IR TAL: I/i
2/IR AOA: I/i
2/IR ATO: I/I
211R
SIP] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4,5,6
MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION
EFFE_S/RATIONALE
APU WILL NOT OPERATE. CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE TO APU REDUNDANCY.
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS i/i FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS, WHERE LOSS OF
ONE _ _ BE _ITICAL, ! _ _!
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REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-288
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
387 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER APU START LOGIC
OUTPUT FAILED ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD" J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) APU
2) CONTROLLER
3) APU START LOGIC
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4,5,6
MC201-0001
CAUSES: SHORT, MANUFACTURING DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTROLLER ACTIVATION PRODUCES IMMEDIATE "START" SIGNAL.
WILL START AS SOON AS FUEL TANK VALVES ARE OPENED.
REFERENCES :
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
APU
w
i
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-289
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 388 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: CONTROLLER "READY" LOGIC
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES sussYs _: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) APU
2) CONTROLLER
3) "READY" LOGIC
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_ _
PRELAUNCH _ 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFr: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBITz 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY S_ENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4,5,6
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS__: .......
NO "APU READY TO START" SIGNAL TO TALKBACK LOGIC. TALKBACK WILL
NOT SHOW "READY". APU WILL BE STARTED ANYWAY.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-290
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zINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 389 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: CONTROLLER "READY" LOGIC
FAILURE MODE: OUTPUT FAILED ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) CONTROLLER
3) "READY" LOGIC
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: r 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/3 TAL:
3/3 AOA:
ATO:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4,5,6
MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTROLLER WILL PRODUCE "APU READY TO START" SIGNAL AS SOON AS IT
IS ACTIVATED. TALKBACK MAY NOT REFLECT APU'S TRUE STATE.
REFERENCES:
n
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-291
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: Ii/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 390 ABORT:
ITEM: CONTROLLERGEARBOXPRESSURECONTROL
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS _: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
APU
CONTROLLER
GEARBOX PRESSURE CONTROL
_TI_TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ..... T.M3ORT - HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT:. 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] _CZ] cCP]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4,5,6 ....
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001 _!_>_
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
CONTROLLER WILL NOT PRODUCE COMMAND TO OPEN GEARBOX
PRESSURIZATION VALVE. IF GEARBOX LOSES PRESSURE (BELOW 5.5
PSIA), APU WILL ONLY START IN OVE_IDE; OIL PUMP MAY CAVITATE.
CRITICALITY I_3/iR: LOSS OF ONE APU IS ONE FAILURE AWAY (GEARBOX
LEAK). ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS, WHERE
LOSS OF ONE APU CAN BE CRITICAL.
REFERENCES :
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-292
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
391 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER GEARBOX PRESSURE CONTROL
OUTPUT FAILED ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) APU
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CONTROLLER
GEARBOX PRESSURE CONTROL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4,5,6
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION (SHORT)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
GEARBOX PRESSURIZATION VALVE IS HELD OPEN; GN2 BOTTLE DUMPS INTO
GEARBOX. IF GEARBOX LEAKS, APU CAN BE LOST. CRITICALITY IS
3/IR: 1 FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF ONE APU.
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS, WHERE LOSS OF
ONE APU CAN BE CRITICAL.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 1211018_ C-293
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 392 ABORT:
ITEM: CONTROLLER GG BED HEATER CONTROL
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF HEATER "ON" SIGNAL
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: _. BARNES
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
S)
8)
9)
APU
CONTROLLER
HEATER CONTROL
GG BED HEATER CONTROL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: .3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/ IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4,5,6
MC201-O001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....._
LOSS OF GAS GENERATOR BED HEATERS. APU CANNOT BE STARTED SAFELY
DUE TO POSSIBLE FUEL DETONATION. CRITICALITY IS 2/IR DUE TO APU
REDUNDANt'Y:....... _ i__-_:_ __ ,_ _i_ _-i-__- _ _ _-_:
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 393 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: CONTROLLER GG BED HEATER CONTROL
FAILURE MODE: HEATER "ON" SIGNAL FAILED ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
APU
CONTROLLER
HEATER CONTROL
GG BED HEATER CONTROL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4,5,6
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION (SHORT)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE OF TWO GAS GENERATOR BED HEATERS IS FAILED ON WHILE ACTIVE,
BUT CAN BE DEACTIVATED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-295
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_ET
DATE: 11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 394 ABORT:
ITEM: CONTROLLER GG/FUEL PUMP HEATER INHIBIT
FAILURE MODE" LOSS OF H_TER "INHIBIT" SIGNAL
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
APU
CONTROLLER
HEATER CONTROL
GG/FUEL PUMP HEATER INHIBIT
CR_TI_TIES
FLIGHT _E HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
__: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4,5,6
MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _
HEATER WILL ACTIVATE WHILE APU IS RUNNING, IF HEATER SWITCH IS
ON, BUT THERMOSTATIC CONTROL WILL PREVENT HEATING WHILE GAS __
GENERATOR BED IS ABOVE 425 F. APU WiLL NOT START IN NORMAL MODE
IF HEATER SWITCH IS TURNED ON-MUST BE STARTED IN OVERRIDE MODE.
CRITICALITY IS 3/IR DUE TO LOSS OF ONE APU START MODE AND APU
REDUNDANCY. : _
REFERENCES :
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-296
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ii/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
395 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER GG/FUEL PUMP HEATER INHIBIT
HEATER "INHIBIT" SIGNAL FAILED ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
APU
CONTROLLER
HEATER CONTROL
GG/FUEL PUMP HEATER INHIBIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 . AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4,5,6
MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION (SHORT)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILED-ON SIGNAL WILL BE LOST ON ORBIT WHEN CONTROLLER IS POWERED
OFF. ONE HEATER WILL BE INHIBITED WHEN CONTROLLER IS ACTIVATED
FOR DEORBIT, BUT APU IS ACTIVATED SOON AFTER. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES :
w
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-297
JDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER _sESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
396 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER START/OVERRIDE LOGIC
LOSS OF START/OVERRIDE COMMAND
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/1R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) CONTROLLER
3) START/OVERRIDE LOGIC
4)
5)
6)
_)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/3 TAL:
3/3 AOA:
3/IR ATO:
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
HDW/FUNC _
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/1R
B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4,5,6
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECI_S_TIONALE: .........
APU WILL NOT START IN OVERRIDE MODE. NO EFFECT UNLESS ANOTHER
FAILURE FORCES OVERRIDE START ATTEMPT. CRITICALITY IS 3/IR: 1
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF ONE APU. i .... _
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
397 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER START/OVERRIDE LOGIC
START/OVERRIDE COMMAND FAILED ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CONTROLLER
START/OVERRIDE LOGIC
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 - RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4,5,6
MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION (SHORT)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
APU WILL START AS SOON AS FUEL TANK VALVES ARE OPENED (IF
CONTROLLER IS ON). NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES :
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
w
REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-299
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
398 ABORT:
CONTRO_ START/OVERRIDE LOGIC
LOSS OF INJECTOR COOLING VALVE COMMAND
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) CONTROLLER
3) START/OVERRIDE LOGIC
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
.... _ITICALITIES
HDw/_c _RT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/1R ATO: _/1R
B [ F] c[p]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4,5,6
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION
LOSS OF REDUNDANT COMMAND TO OPEN INJECTOR COOLING VALVE FOR ONE
APU. CRITI_TY IS 3/iR FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU
STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
APU FLIGHT:
399 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROLLER START/OVERRIDE LOGIC
INJECTOR COOLING VALVE COMMAND FAILED ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES
BREAKDOWN
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
HIERARCHY:
APU
CONTROLLER
START/OVERRIDE LOGIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ F]
LOCATION: AV BAY 4,5,6
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION (SHORT)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN CONTROLLER IS ACTIVATED, INJECTOR COOLING WATER WILL BE
SPRAYED ON AFFECTED APU TO DEPLETION OR UNTIL CONTROLLER
DEACTIVATION. NO EFFECT, EXCEPT LOSS OF HOT RESTART CAPABILITY.
CRITICALITY IS I/i FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN.
APU STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE.
REFERENCES :
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REPORT DATE 12/10/86 C-301
INDEPENDENT ORBITER_SESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 400 ABORT:
_Dw/_'_c
3/3
3/3
ITEM=
FAILURE MODE=
CONTRO_ BITE LOGIC
LOSS OF OUTPUT, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS _: _. BAR_S
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) APU
2) CONTROLLER
3) BITE LOGIC
4)
5)
6)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF= 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT" 3/3 AOA: 3./3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AV BAY 4,5,6
MC201-0001
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, CONTAMINATION
EFFE_S/_TIONALE: ....., _::_
CANNOT V_FY CONTROLLER PRELAUNCH-POSSIBLE LAUNCH DELAY. BITE
IS NOT USED AFT_ER LIFTOFF.
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APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
ITEM FAILURE MODE
GAS GENERATOR
GAS GENERATOR
TURBINE WHEEL
TURBINE WHEEL
EXHAUST DUCT
EXHAUST DUCT BELLOWS
GEARBOX
MAGNETIC PICKUP UNIT 1
FUEL TANK
FUEL TANK
FUEL TANK
FUEL TANK
FUEL TANK GN2 LINE
FUEL TANK GN2 FILL
COUPLING
FUEL TANK ISOLATION
VALVE
FUEL'TANK ISOLATION
VALVE
FUEL TANK ISOLATION
VALVE
FUEL TANK ISOLATION
VALVE
FUEL PUMP
FUEL PUMP
FUEL PUMP
FUEL PUMP BYPASS
VALVE
FUEL PUMP BYPASS
VALVE
FUEL PUMP RELIEF
VALVE
FUEL PUMP RELIEF
VALVE
FUEL PUMP RELIEF
VALVE
FUEL PUMP FILTER
FUEL PUMP FILTER
FUEL PUMP DRAIN
COUPLING
PRIMARY FUEL VALVE
PRIMARY FUEL VALVE
PRIMARY FUEL VALVE
PRIMARY FUEL VALVE
NO OUTPUT OR LOW OUTPUT
LEAK
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
BINDING
LEAK
LEAK
LOSS OF OUTPUT
NO OUTPUT, OR
INTERMITTENT OUTPUT
RUPTURE AT OPERATING
PRESSURE
EXTERNAL LEAK (FUEL)
EXTERNAL LEAK (GN2)
INTERNAL LEAK THROUGH
DIAPHRAGM
LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAK
FAILS TO CLOSE (STUCK
OPEN); INTERNAL LEAK
BARRIER LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAK
FAILS TO RELIEVE
INTERNAL LEAK PAST
FACE SEAL
EXTERNAL LEAK
NO OUTPUT OR LOW OUTPUT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS CLOSED
RELIEVES AT LOW
PRESSURE/FAILS OPEN
FAILS TO RELIEVE
EXTERNAL LEAK
BLOCKAGE
FAILS OPEN-NO
FILTERING
EXTERNAL LEAK
FAILS TO OPEN (STUCK CLOSED)
INTERNAL LEAK TO BYPASS
INTERNAL BARRIER LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAK
D-I
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145
147
149
150
151
152
153
155
156
157
158
170
174
175
176
177
178
180
181
183
184
185
187
189
195
197
198
199
201
203
204
206
208
ITEM
SECONDARY FUEL VALVE
SECONDARY FUEL VALVE
SECONDARY FUEL VALVE
SECONDARY FUEL VALVE
FUEL LINE-UPSTREAM OF
TANK ISOL
FUEL LINE-DOWNSTREAM OF
TANK ISOL
FUEL. TANK HYDRAZINE FILL
COUPLING .........
FUEL LINE TEST POINT
COUPLING
FUEL LINE TEST POINT
COUPLING
FUEL LINE FLEX HOSE
FUE_LLLINEHIGH POINT
BLEED COUPLING
FUEL PUMP SEAL CAVITY
DRAIN LINE
FUEL IN_LINE FILTER
FUEL IN-LINE FILTER
FUEL IN-LINE FILTER
SEAL CAVITY DRAIN LINE
SEAL CAVITY DRAIN FLEX
HOSE
SEAL CAVITY DRAIN RELIEF
VALVE ....
SEAL CAVITY D_IN RELIEF
VALVE
SEAL CAVITY DRAIN RELIEF
VALVE
SEAL CAVITY DRAIN CATCH
BOTTLE
SEAL CAVITY DRAIN CATCH
BOTTLE DRAIN VALVE _
LUBE OIL PUMP
G_BgX GN2 BOTTLE
GEARBOX PRESSURIZATION
VALVE
LUBE OIL LINES
LUBE OIL LINE FL_ HOSES
GEARBOX FILL COUPLING
GEARBOX HIGH POINT VENT
COUPLING
GEARBOX CHIP DETECTOR
GEARBOX LOW POINT DRAIN
FAILURE MODE
FAILS TO OPEN; FAILS TO
REMAIN OPEN
FAILS MID-POSITION
INTERNAL LEAK TO BYPASS
EXTERNAL LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAK
FAILS CLOSED
LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAK
FAIL CLOSED
BLOCKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAK
FAILS OPEN-NO FILTERING
EXTERNAL LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAK
LOW CRACKING PRESSURE
FA_LS TO RESEAT (FAILS
OPEN), LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAK
LEAK
NO OUTPUT OR LOW OUTPUT
RUPTURE AT OPERATING
PRESSURE
EXTERNAL LEAK
LEAK
LEAK °:
EXTERNAL LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAK
COUPLING .............._:_,__...... _
G-EA_BOX HIGH POIIq_:DRAIN _ EXTERNAL LEAK
COUPLING
WSB DRAIN COUPLING EXTERNAL LEAK
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214
215
216
217
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
228
229
231
233
2'34
235
237
238
239
246
248
249
251
254
255
256
ITEM
LUBE OIL FILTER
LUBE OIL FILTER
OIL FILTER BYPASS RELIEF
VALVE
OIL FILTER BYPASS RELIEF
VALVE
GEARBOX BYPASS RELIEF
VALVE
LUBE OIL ACCUMULATOR
(ADD-ON)
LUBE OIL ACCUMULATOR
(ADD-ON)
LUBE OIL ACCUMULATOR
(INTEGRAL)
LUBE OIL ACCUMULATOR
(INTEGRAL)
INJECTOR COOLING VALVE
INJECTOR COOLING VALVE
INJECTOR COOLING VALVE
INJECTOR COOLING VALVE
INJECTOR COOLING WATER
TANK
INJECTOR COOLING GN2
FILL COUPLING
INJECTOR COOLING WATER
LINES (MANIFOLD)
INJECTOR COOLING WATER
LINES (MANIFOLD)
INJECTOR COOLING WATER
FILL COUPLING
INJECTOR COOLING WATER
LINE-APU X
INJECTOR COOLING WATER
LINE-APU X
INJECTOR COOLING WATER
LINE FLEX HOSE
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING
RELIEF VALVE
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING
RELIEF VALVE
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING
GN2 LINE
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING
VALVE
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING
WATER TANK
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING
WATER TANK
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING
WATER LINES - BETWEEN
TANK AND TANK VALVES
D-3
FAILURE MODE
FAILS OPEN/NO FILTERING
EXTERNAL LEAK
FAILS CLOSED
FAILS TO CLOSE (STUCK OPEN),
OR FAILS OPEN, OR LEAKS
FAILS OPEN, OR FAILS TO
CLOSE, OR LEAKS
EXTERNAL LEAK
INTERNAL LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAK
INTERNAL LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAK
INTERNAL LEAK
FAIL TO OPEN, FAIL TO
REMAIN OPEN
BARRIER FAILURE
EXTERNAL LEAK (WATER
OR N2)
EXTERNAL LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAK
BLOCKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAK
BLOCKAGE
LEAK
FAIL CLOSED; RELIEVE OVER
SPEC
EXTERNAL LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAK
FAIL OPEN (FAIL TO CLOSE),
INTERNAL LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAK (WATER OR
N2)
DIAPHRAGM LEAK
LEAK
MDAC-ID
257
258
260
264
266
267
276
277
278
279
28O
281
282
286
287
288
289
306
314
315
316
317
319
322
323
326
328
329
330
331
ITEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING
WATER LINES - BETWEEN
TANK AND TANK VALVES
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING
WATER FILL COUPLING
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING
WATER LINES - BETWEEN
TANK VALVE AND APU
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING
WATER TANK VALVE
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING
WATER TANK VALVE
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING
WATER TANK VALVE
EXHAUST PLENUM HOUSING
EXHAUST PLENUM HOUSING
EXHAUST PLENUM HOUSING
GEARBOX HOUSING
"APU CONTROL" SWITCH
"APU CONTROL" SWITCH
"APU CONTROL" SWITCH
APU CONTROL CIRCUIT
SWITCH POWER FUSE
APU CONTROL CIRCUIT
START CONTROL INPUT DIODE
"APU CNTLR PWR" SWITCH
"APU CNTLR PWR" SWITCH
"APU AUTO SHUTDOWN"
SWITCH
FUEL TANK VALVE SWITCH
FUEL TANK VALVE SWITCH
FUEL TANK VALVE SWITCH
FUEL TANK VALVE SWITCH
FUEL TANK VALVE CIRCUIT
DRIVER
FU_T=ANK_VALVE SWITCH _
POWER FUSE
FUEL TANK VALVE SWITCH
OUTPUT DIODE
"PUMP/VLV COOL" SWITCH
"PUMP/VLV COOL" SWITCH
"PUMP/VLV C00L"EWIT_H _
POWER CIRCUIT POWER FUSE
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING
CONTROL CIRCUIT POWER
FUSE_ _,_
FUEL PUMP/GGVMCOOLING
CONTROL CIRCUIT POWER
INPUT DIODE
FAILURE MODE
BLOCKAGE
LEAK
LEAK
FAIL TO OPEN; FAIL TO
REMAIN OPEN
INTERNAL BARRIER LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAK
EXTERNAL LEAK
CRACKING
INTERNAL LEAK
LEAK
FAIL TO CLOSE
FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
FAIL TO OPEN (STUCK IN
"START/RUN")
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN, SHORT TO
GROUND
FAIL TO CLOSE
FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
FAIL TO CLOSE
FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED
FAIL TO OPEN
INADVERTENT OPERATION
FAIL ON
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN, OR SHORT TO
GROUND
= __
FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO
REMAIN CLOSED
INADVERTENT OPERATION
FAIL'OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
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337
339
340
343
344
346
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352
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357
376
377
379
380
383
384
385
386
ITEM
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING
CONTROL CIRCUIT POWER
INPUT DIODE
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING
CONTROL CIRCUIT INPUT
RESISTOR
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING
CONTROL CIRCUIT INPUT
RESISTOR
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING
CONTROL CIRCUIT POWER
INPUT DRIVER
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING
CONTROL CIRCUIT POWER
INPUT DRIVER
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING
VALVE POWER DIODE
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING
VALVE POWER DIODE
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING
TANK VALVE POWER FUSE
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING
TANK VALVE DRIVER
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING
THERMOSTAT
FUEL/H20 HEATER CONTROL
CIRCUIT
FUEL/H20 HEATER CONTROL
CIRCUIT
GAS GEN/FUEL PUMP
HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT
"APU HEATER, LUBE OIL
LINE" SWITCH
FUEL TEST LINE
TEMPERATURE SENSOR
FUEL PUMP SEAL CAVITY
DRAIN LINE TEMPERATURE
SENSOR
CONTROLLER SAFETY
MONITORING
CONTROLLER SAFETY
MONITORING
CONTROLLER PRIMARY
SPEED CONTROL
CONTROLLER SECONDARY
SPEED CONTROL
CONTROLLER SECONDARY
SPEED CONTROL
CONTROLLER APU START
LOGIC
FAILURE MODE
SHORT TO GROUND
FAIL OPEN, OR HIGH
RESISTANCE
INTERNAL SHORT, LOW
RESISTANCE, OR SHORT
TO GROUND-
FAIL OFF
SHORT TO GROUND
FAIL OPEN
SHORT TO GROUND
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OFF, OPEN CIRCUIT,
SHORT TO GROUND
FAIL OPEN
CIRCUIT DRIVER FAIL ON
FUEL PUMP DRAIN LINE
HEATER THERMOSTAT INPUT
DRIVER FAIL ON
CIRCUIT DRIVER FAIL ON
FAIL TO CLOSE, FAIL TO
REMAIN CLOSED
NO OUTPUT, OR ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT
NO OUTPUT, OR ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT
NO SHUTDOWN SIGNAL
SPURIOUS SHUTDOWN
SIGNAL
OUTPUT FAILED ON,
SPURIOUS OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT,
INTERMITTENT OUTPUT
OUTPUT FAILED ON,
SPURIOUS OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT,
INTERMITTENT OUTPUT
D-5
MDAC-ID
390
392
398
399
ITEM FAILURE MODE
CONTROLLER GEARBOX LOSS OF OUTPUT
PRESSURE CONTROL
CONTROLLER GG BED LOSS OF HEATER "ON"
HEATE_C_NTROL ........ SIGNAL
CONTROLLER START/OVER- LOSS OF INJECTOR COOLING
RIDE LOGIC VALVE COMMAND
CONTROLLER START/OVER- LOGIC INJECTOR COOLING
RIDE LOGIC VALVE COMMAND FAILED ON
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